Guillaume Long: “I believe Trump’s political intuition is to not intervene militarily”

Guillaume Long was a minister in the government of Rafael Correa, between 2013 and 2017. Today he works as senior research fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research.

Guacamaya, November 16, 2025. Guillaume Long is senior research fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) and professor at Sciences Po. In addition, he is diplomatic advisor in the The Hague Group, the coalition of countries that is taking measures to confront the genocide in Gaza.

He was a university professor when they called him to enter the government of Rafael Correa in 2011. He held several posts until becoming Coordinating Minister of Knowledge and Human Talent (2013-2015), Minister of Culture and Heritage (2015-2016), and finally Minister of Foreign Affairs (2016-2017). The successor of Correa, Lenin Moreno, sent him as ambassador to the United Nations, although Long did not take long to break with the 180-degree turn of the new president.

We have much to ask him: about the case of Julian Assange, his break with Lenin Moreno, his stance on Venezuela, his opinion about President Daniel Noboa, and what he thinks about the military deployment of the United States in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Finally, we ask him to explain to us what the The Hague Group does.

Q: How does someone who was born in France become a minister in Ecuador and for 4 years? And also, where does the relationship with then-president Rafael Correa come from?

A: No, look, I am also Ecuadorian, right? Yes, I was born in France, but I lived many years in Ecuador and I was naturalized Ecuadorian at the appropriate moment. I lived about 20 years I think in Ecuador, so I am probably more Ecuadorian than French today.

Then, the relationship with President Correa began when I was an academic at FLACSO (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences), I was a professor at some universities. I was in the final phase of completing my doctorate in London when several colleagues introduced us. Because the government of Correa was a government with quite a presence of academics, of technicians, there were many economists there as well.

Several then joined the government. It was an important moment, I would say, very utopian. I speak of our constituent movement back there in 2007 or 2008, with new rules of the game, creating a new society, seeking great social, political, economic transformations, for a “society of good living.”

So, several colleagues, dear friends, entered the government. And well, some convinced me that I had to join this political project. At some point I agreed, and it was a wonderful life experience. Of course, also a difficult, arduous, complicated political struggle of about 10 years, the Correa government 2007-2017. Which unfortunately ended with an almost Shakespearean betrayal, right? On the part of Lenin Moreno.

That was how little by little I entered. First as advisor of the Ministry of Planning, then as president of a regulation council of the university system and academic quality. Then as minister, first of Human Talent, then of Culture, and finally of Foreign Affairs in the government of Rafael Correa.

“Ecuador granted asylum to Julian Assange because there existed the risk that he would be extradited to the United States for his activities as a journalist, for his activities as a ‘whistleblower’, as for his leadership of the organization WikiLeaks. And everything else was an issue that could be resolved.”

Q: I precisely wanted to ask you about an episode while you were foreign minister, about Julian Assange. He was asylee in the Ecuadorian embassy in London from 2012 until 2019. What was the interest of the Ecuadorian government in protecting him and why did he choose this embassy in particular?

A: That is a good question. One would have to ask him because in reality the State of Ecuador ended up betraying him, right? When there was the transition and Lenin Moreno took charge of the presidency, Ecuador treated him very badly, Julian Assange. He finally invited, on that fateful April 11, 2019, the security forces of the United Kingdom to enter our embassy and take him to prison in what were 5 more years of nightmare, of risk of extradition to the United States, etcetera, etcetera. So, finally, the role of Ecuador ended up being ambiguous, right?

At first it saved his life, in the first years, but later when there was a transition with a new government it betrayed the right to asylum, in fact, violated the Ecuadorian Constitution itself. It violated the sacred principle of “non-refoulement”, which is very important in asylum law, which is enshrined in international law, and handed him over to the United Kingdom.

In the end, he decided on Ecuador, one would have to ask Julian, I believe he was interested in the political project in Ecuador, he had already had an interview even with President Correa. At that time, in 2012, Ecuador was seen in the world as a country of much progress, proposing new ideas. Julian Assange, I believe, is someone characterized by his interest in new things, new ideas, the frontier of ideas, right? And I believe that Ecuador in some sense was one of the countries of the global south that most innovated politically. I believe that was what convinced Assange.

From there, well, it was a complicated foreign policy for Ecuador, for us. Obviously the relationship with the United States was involved, also the relationship with the United Kingdom, the relationship with Sweden.

The first thing that was resolved was with Sweden, because little by little they began to understand that this was harming them. There was a very important report from the United Nations working group that established that Assange was a victim of arbitrary detention. And the Swedes realized that they were being accused of a very serious human rights violation. For which finally one could give way to the great demands of Ecuador, and one of them that the citizen Julian Assange, who did not face any charge, could be interviewed in our embassy.

The idea is that he had to be interviewed so that later the Swedish authorities could decide whether they were going to file charges or not. And finally he was interviewed, the Swedish prosecutor’s office took a few more months to decide that it was not going to file charges. For which, in theory, Assange could leave the Ecuadorian embassy free, and his nightmare would end.

Unfortunately the United Kingdom decided that they were going to look for the fifth leg of the cat, I believe that is how one must say it, saying that he had violated his bail by entering the Ecuadorian jurisdiction and that therefore, if he left they would arrest him. We asked for guarantees as Ecuador from the United Kingdom that they would not extradite him to the United States. Assange would be willing obviously to spend two or three months in a jail, in the worst case for violating his bail. But we asked that it could be guaranteed that there would be no extradition process to the United States. The United Kingdom refused to give these guarantees. Obviously, today we know why, because they had every intention of extraditing him to the United States and for that reason Julian Assange could not leave the embassy free. With the change of government this process was extended two more years, but finally he was delivered to the United Kingdom.

How good that finally after 5 years, first 7 years in the Ecuadorian embassy and then 5 years in a maximum-security prison in the United Kingdom, one could reach an agreement with the Biden administration and finally Julian Assange could come out free, thanks to the pressure of many people around the world, of a movement for his freedom.

Also everyone realized that the issue of Sweden, which was the initial accusation, for supposed sexual violence, no longer existed and that therefore only remained the persecution for his role in WikiLeaks. That is to say, there remained an evidently political accusation, which had to do with freedom of expression, which had to do with journalism, and for that reason Ecuador had granted him asylum.

This I believe is the most important thing. Ecuador granted asylum to Julian Assange because there existed the risk that he would be extradited to the United States for his activities as a journalist, for his activities as a “whistleblower”, as for his leadership of the organization WikiLeaks. And everything else was an issue that could be resolved.

Ecuador was in agreement, in fact Julian Assange himself was in agreement in going to answer questions in Sweden from the Swedish prosecutor’s office. It is an issue that we always wanted, Ecuador always asked for a guarantee of non-extradition to the United States. So when the process in Sweden collapsed —I insist that there were never charges filed— but there was a request, there was an arrest warrant on the basis of an interrogation request. When the interrogation took place in the embassy in London and no charges were filed, there was nothing left, only the threat of extradition.

So, as if we closed the circle completely, we returned to the beginning. And I believe that that meant that even big international media that had abandoned Assange, that had believed the narrative about the supposed sexual violence in Sweden as something genuine, not to persecute him, turned back. Even hegemonic media outlets, the New York Times, the Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Post, together published an editorial calling for his release. More mainstream hegemonic voices of the political center of the board worldwide began to express their concern that Assange was being persecuted, which finally led to a process which fortunately led to his release last year.

So yes, I believe that the role of Ecuador was positive, we managed to play a fundamental role to save his life, to protect him. But also the great betrayal of Lenin Moreno in 2017, culminating in 2019 with the expulsion of Assange from the embassy, cost him 5 more years in a maximum-security prison in the United Kingdom, for which I believe that the role of Ecuador in that sense unfortunately has two faces, right? One very positive for him and another much more negative.

“As an international actor that I am and that we were, the most important thing was to identify the illegalities and the arbitrariness of this international situation. And these were clearly, in their first place, the sanctions regime imposed by the United States.”

Q: As foreign minister you were criticized for your position regarding Venezuela, especially during the protests of 2017, which is when you were in office. Why did you not take a more critical position with Maduro? And how do you think democratic left-wing forces, especially of Latin America, should deal with Maduro after the accusations of electoral fraud of July 28?

A: I believe that the position of Ecuador was to try to support a negotiation process that already existed in Venezuela.

There was a negotiation process with several former presidents of the region, I am not going to go into details, but there were presidents Leonel Fernández, Martín Torrijos, and Ernesto Samper in his capacity also as secretary general of UNASUR, former president José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of Spain. There was a whole process to try to resolve the political issues.

What we saw is that there were also many attempts, external as well, to try to undermine this negotiation process. And we were always on the side of a political solution, a pact-based, negotiated solution. Not on the side of violence, not on the side of those who, including some international actors such as Luis Almagro from the OAS and others, sought to exacerbate positions. They sought the polarization of the Venezuelan political spectrum.

We were also never on the side of sanctions and this is important, our role was to defend Venezuela from the illegal attacks in terms of the sanctions imposed by the United States, beginning with Obama’s national security emergency declaration of 2015, then the more financial sanctions of 2017, and the later sanctions after we were out of government, more petroleum-related, of 2019.

The sanctions regime that we have denounced has been one of the main factors for the severe economic crisis, although it is not the only factor. There is a direct correlation between the fall of the first export item of Venezuela, which is oil, and the sanctions. It went from 1,600,000 barrels per day —of course one can go further back when Venezuela had 3 million barrels per day of exports— but there is a direct correlation between the oil sanctions and this fall from 1,600,000 barrels per day to 300,000 barrels per day more or less, which causes basically the collapse of the Venezuelan state. There is also this correlation with all economic indicators and obviously the great migratory wave is also the result of the sanctions regime.

Of course, I can have my opinions about one or another policy, but that is already entering into issues that are sovereign issues of Venezuela. But as an international actor, I understand that Venezuelan political actors have as a prerogative to be in the Venezuelan national political debate, but as an international actor that I am and that we were, the most important thing was to identify the illegalities and the arbitrariness of this international situation. And these were clearly, in their first place, the sanctions regime imposed by the United States.

Then, I believe that unfortunately there is a situation of polarization that has been worsening in Venezuela. There are many factors for this situation of polarization. I believe that the opposition and the United States have also played a role going back from 2002 onward with all the boycotts of electoral processes. I have closely followed elections in Venezuela, many elections that were denounced as fraudulent by the international community, in my view were not.

Yes I believe that the last elections in Venezuela were much more problematic. In fact, the think tank for which I work, CEPR, produced a rather critical report, going into much more detail, I invite the audience to read this report to see what the problems of the last elections in Venezuela were.

But well, we reached a situation of conflict that could have been avoided, resolved, mediated much earlier, right? So, I believe that there one would have to identify all the culprits. The recognition of a parallel government unprecedented in the history of the OAS, for example, granting a seat to the representative of the supposed president Juan Guaidó. That did not happen even with Pinochet, nor with any military dictatorship in Latin America. And if we go to the other end of the political spectrum neither with the revolutionaries of Havana, there was no recognition of a parallel government in Miami.

In short, many taboos have been broken with the policy of the United States and also of other actors towards Venezuela, and much polarization that has unfortunately provoked a political situation that I do not believe will be resolved by force nor by violence. That was fundamentally our position.

“I believe that Trump seeks a regime change in Venezuela and I believe that his political intuition, his, not necessarily that of other figures in his administration, is not to intervene militarily.”

Q: Seeing the U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean, what do you think is Trump’s final objective? Do you believe there is a real threat of armed operations inside Venezuela to overthrow Maduro?

A: I believe that Trump seeks a regime change in Venezuela and I believe that his political intuition, his, not necessarily that of other figures in his administration, is not to intervene militarily. It is only to seek that a group of Venezuelan officers rise up inside the armed forces of Venezuela, the FANB.

This is an unprecedented threat in the history of Latin America, and in the history of South America. One must not forget that this would be the first direct military attack by the United States on a South American country in our history. There have been threats, there have been coups, a series of interventions, but not a military attack on a South American country of this nature. For which it is absolutely an extraordinary situation, it is a very strong, brutal military escalation in the Caribbean. I think that Trump believes that with this escalation he can scare different actors in Venezuela and force a regime change.

I believe that this is not going to work. I believe that the loyalty of the Venezuelan military with the government today is quite shielded. There have been so many attempts at regime change, so many coups, “pseudo-coups” or supposed coups especially in the year 2019. Every failed coup strengthens the security apparatus of a country. Every time a coup d’état fails, the actors are revealed, the actors that would be potentially in rebellion are exposed and the control of the government over the security apparatus and over the military is strengthened, obviously. And today, today I believe that this is quite shielded in Venezuela.

Now, I believe that there are other actors in the Trump administration that indeed would like to be able to use all these toys that they are mobilizing there in the Caribbean. In first place, the leader of this faction inside the Trump administration that truly wants a military exit, is called Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State. From the first Trump administration, being at that time senator, he also pressured a lot —and we have a lot of evidence of that— for a regime change in Venezuela, for support to coup-plotting actors, for the parallel presidency of Juan Guaidó.

We also know that, as Cuban descendant, he sees the Venezuelan problem and the Cuban problem as intimately linked. He believes that the road to Havana passes through Caracas. I believe that there is a very strong debate inside the administration at this moment to see whether one simply continues with the same policies of bombing these vessels, whether it is an intimidation without going further to try to motivate some actors in Venezuela to rise up through covert actions, or whether there is really going to be an attack, probably aerial.

And this is what is at stake. The “MAGA” base (Make America Great Again) of Trump, I do not believe that it is very in favor of this. Furthermore, it is an electoral offer of Trump, not to incur into new eternal wars. But the neoconservatives, both in the first Trump administration and in the second, are very present. This MAGA base is more isolationist, more centered on domestic aspects, it is not necessarily in favor of imperial adventures.

But another thing is the more traditional part of the Republican Party, is the strong presence of actors from the state of Florida in the Trump administration and their strong influence over U.S. foreign policy for Latin America.

I believe that this is what is at stake at this moment, that if they do it, it will be a disaster. If the sanctions managed to make between 7 and 8 million Venezuelans leave the country, I cannot imagine the humanitarian crisis that could result from a military attack, including the migratory one, including for the countries of the region, but also for the United States. So it seems to me that it is an absolutely senseless policy.

Q: We have seen several attacks, I believe almost 20, in the Caribbean and the Pacific against boats that Trump accuses of carrying drugs to the United States. It seems that they have affected nationals not only of Venezuela, but also Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and Trinidad. But there are hardly protests by the governments of the region. Do you believe they are being too compliant? What precedents are being created?

A: Yes, I believe that in general my answer would be that Latin America has been too compliant. There are actors in Latin America that are denouncing these bellicose purposes. We have seen protests or reactions against this military escalation by Mexico and Brazil, and in a much stronger way by Colombia.

We have also seen protests by CARICOM (the Caribbean Community), which is an important actor. Of course the nations of the Caribbean are being very affected, but there are also countries that are supporting Trump, including in the Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago is one of them, Argentina and Ecuador, of course. In short, it is a situation in which there is no unity of the region.

It is eh very regrettable because just a few years ago there was a consensus in Latin America. Both on the right and on the left, in fact, that South America in the first place be a zone of peace. That was an important pillar of the consolidation of the regional project of UNASUR, the Union of South American Nations. And later it extended to CELAC, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

There was a consensus that the solutions to the problems or to the conflicts had to be peaceful, had to be diplomatic. This consensus was also a very important pillar of the peace process in Colombia itself, which was supported by actors in Latin America of various ideological and political hues.

Unfortunately, today we are seeing a right wing in Latin America increasingly radicalized, increasingly more Trumpist if one wants, increasingly aligned with Trump and this means that there is no consensus, there is no consensus in Latin America. It is very regrettable that some countries of South America are willing to break with this historical legacy that there has never been a military attack by the United States on a South American country.

In the first place, it seems very unpatriotic of them, very little sovereign of them. And furthermore, this is the issue, let us say, more in the perhaps symbolic sphere of sovereignty which seems fundamental to me: If there is no respect for sovereignty, there is no respect for states, for their populations and for their self-determination, that seems fundamental to me.

But apart from that, it seems very serious to me that they are willing to risk a humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, but also that, as we know, would extend to the region. We saw it in the important humanitarian crisis that was generated with the great wave of migrants during the last years of sanctions and internal political conflict inside Venezuela.

That is to say, a Libyan scenario for Latin America, obviously would be the result and would affect their countries a lot, so it is not only unethical, it is also irresponsible and quite alarming that Latin American countries are not more united on this issue.

In addition to what you just mentioned, the clear illegality of the bombings on the vessels that affect Latin American citizens, the role of any government is obviously to defend eh the life of its citizens. We do not know what they have done, but if these citizens have committed crimes, then they must be brought before justice. They cannot be killed extrajudicially in this way. The death penalty does not exist in all these countries that have been affected and yet, in practice, a death penalty is being applied without due process, without any judicial process. So it seems very serious to me that countries like mine, for example, like Ecuador, are accepting that without blinking. It seems very serious to me, in fact.

“The true purpose of Trump was initially to give a domestic effect, and now this has mutated into a sort of intimidation for a regime change, pushed above all opportunistically by Marco Rubio.”

Q: Brazil and Qatar have put themselves forward as mediators between Trump and Maduro. From your experience as a diplomat, how could these initiatives be articulated to prevent a greater escalation? How should the Venezuelan political conflict be resolved?

A: I believe that it would be very important that Brazil, Qatar or any other state, any other group of countries, including Latin Americans, could self-convene and serve as mediators between the United States and Venezuela.

It would not be the first time that this happens. We had in the 80s the Contadora Group. It was a Latin American group in which four Latin American countries played a very important role in trying to mediate in the Central American crises. This era, the 80s, was marked by the civil wars in Nicaragua, in El Salvador, in Guatemala, and this group served so that we could finally reach in the early 90s peace processes in Nicaragua, in El Salvador a little later in the 90s, and in Guatemala as well.

There are precedents for this, it could be not only Brazil, even actors that are much more critical of Venezuela. Although Brazil has been quite critical of Venezuela, in fact about the last Venezuelan elections, but we could have even actors even more antagonistic than Brazil but who believe in a peaceful solution.

If the issue truly is drug trafficking… Which is suspicious because we know that in Venezuela without a doubt cocaine passes through there, but in statistical terms it is not the place from which most of the cocaine leaves to the United States nor to Europe. Rather there are other actors, more on the Pacific side, that have governments close to the United States, from where much more drugs are leaving than through Venezuela.

But well, if the problem is drug trafficking and guarantees are needed, there are mechanisms that could be adopted. International mechanisms that could give greater guarantees that drug trafficking is being controlled and with which I am almost sure that one could reach an agreement even with Venezuela. So, this path could at least be explored to see whether an agreement can be reached. So, there is, of course, the diplomatic path, which has not been explored and should be explored.

I insist, I believe that it is not the true purpose of the Trump administration. Its purpose was initially to give a domestic effect, “look, American electorate, I am taking action, I am fighting crime, I am being intransigent, I am killing the bad guys,” as he calls them, and now this has mutated into a sort of intimidation for a regime change, pushed above all opportunistically by Marco Rubio.

But of course, if we want to de-escalate, there are several mechanisms to de-escalate that Trump could present to his electorate and to the world as a great deal, right? Only he could do it, and I am sure that he would find in Venezuela an actor that probably would want to negotiate certain aspects. Because it is not in Venezuela’s interest, of course, to have an armed conflict with the United States, far from it.

Q: Returning to Ecuador, it is very hard for me to understand the process led by Lenin Moreno, that is, he goes from being the vice president of Rafael Correa, his natural successor, to being his worst enemy. How did that happen?

A: That is the million-dollar question. I am not inside Moreno’s head. It was a Shakespearean betrayal. It truly was worthy of a work of Shakespeare: a radical and brutal betrayal. It is not only a betrayal in terms of changing government policy, but public policy in all areas, in the social, economic sphere, bringing the International Monetary Fund, privatizations, austerity. Totally changing the development model of Ecuador. The same in foreign policy, bringing again a presence of U.S. security forces, expelling Assange, leaving UNASUR. The host country of UNASUR, which had many benefits, leaving UNASUR. Quito was already the Brussels in some way, and shoots itself in the foot, harming itself to affect, I don’t know, the reputation of Correa, to, I don’t know, mark a rupture with his geopolitical legacy, in short.

But it is not only that, it is not only the policies but also the persecution of his former government colleagues, imprisoning several people. Making a reform, basically a referendum at the time when Moreno still enjoyed popularity at the beginning of his government, months later he would have lost it, but at that moment he won the referendum so that he could have control over the judicial system. Changing the judges, putting anti-Correistas and unleashing the judicial system against Correa-ism with absolutely flawed processes and with a whole generation of politicians that leave Ecuador for exile. At this moment many of whom are in Mexico and in other countries, and of course former president Correa in Belgium, someone who was accused of things of psychic influence, right?

His appeal was handled in 17 days so that he could not be candidate. We had an Ecuadorian ex-president with different accusations but of the same legal type, if one wants, much more serious accusations, whose appeal process was resolved in 4 years. But Correa’s, in 17 days and in the middle of a pandemic. Clearly in politicized trials led from the presidency. Moreno became the great persecutor. Unfortunately his two heirs, Guillermo Lasso —who could not finish his term of government, resigned for serious corruption accusations— and now the current president, Daniel Noboa, have continued in this same trajectory, which is to try to end the political phenomenon of Correa-ism, at any cost, with terrible authoritarian and repressive policies. And not trying to create democratic conditions and make some sort of peace, if one wants, with the political opposition.

Moreno’s strategy has continued over time and we continue in Ecuador with a tilted playing field in every electoral process, with actors in exile. Right now we have a referendum and the biggest political party in the country which is called RC, Citizen Revolution, which is the party of president Correa, absurdly, has been prohibited from campaigning on two questions. Of the four questions, it can campaign for “no”, as it is a referendum, on two questions, but not on the other two. A sort of surrealism of bureaucratic lawfare, micro-lawfare bureaucratic, but which at the end adding all these forms of persecution, of “micro-persecutions” if one wants, you arrive at a “macro-persecution”, with a tilted field that is not at all democratic.

The Citizen Revolution Party was first prohibited, then was reconstituted and today it continues being the biggest political party in the country. It won the elections, it was the biggest parliamentary force. Now it is the second biggest parliamentary force because several assembly members have given up, have left the party. They were, we do not know, intimidated, blackmailed, one does not know very well. Some left the ranks. So it is almost tied with Noboa’s party, but number two. Of course, the Noboa party is a party of the last elections that probably will not exist when Noboa is no longer in power.

Rafael Correa’s party is a much more organic party, that exists in all the provinces at territorial level. It is the party that has the largest number of governorships, we call them prefectures in Ecuador, and the largest number of mayoralties, including Quito and Guayaquil, the two most important cities in the country. So, it is a vibrant party that exists, but that cannot win in the second round of presidential elections. We already have several elections in which it cannot win in the second round, because there is this tilted playing field, because the media carry out this continuous campaign against Correa’s left. Because there are rules of the game that prevent campaigning on equal footing, persecution, the cadres in exile, all these things. Everything is born with the betrayal of Lenin Moreno without a doubt.

“There is no investigative journalism in Ecuador at this moment, they are all subsumed to power, I believe they are afraid. Noboa’s government has been very authoritarian.”

Q: Taking into account the supposed fight against drug trafficking of the United States in the region, you have made accusations against Daniel Noboa’s family business of participating in drug trafficking as well. What evidence exists for such a serious accusation, and what is the relationship between this issue and the security crisis that exists today in Ecuador?

A: First starting with the second part of your question. The security crisis is brutal. It is the biggest decline in security, the biggest erosion in security of a country of Latin America in peacetime, in contemporary times. We have gone, when Correa’s government ended, from 5.8 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in the year 2017, being one of the safest countries in the region, to 8 years later already in December we are going to end with 50 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. That is to say, if the statistical trend continues, we are going to reach 50, almost 9 or 10 times more.

Ecuador is the most insecure country in Latin America, and if it were not for some countries of very low eh population in the Caribbean, some of the Caribbean islands that have less than 200,000 inhabitants and that changes the statistic because if you have a murder, well, the homicide rate shoots up. If not for these small islands Ecuador would be the country of the world with the highest homicide rate in the world in peacetime. So, it is incredible that we have gone from being one of the safest countries in Latin America to one of the most dangerous in the world in so little time. That is the grave situation that Ecuador is facing.

Obviously this has a lot to do with drug trafficking. With gangs fighting among themselves for the control of the ports in the Pacific, from where products are taken by ship to different countries of the world and there the cocaine is put in.

Now, with Daniel Noboa and the Noboa family being the biggest banana producers of the country and with Ecuador being the country the biggest producer of bananas, a great deal of drugs has been found in banana boxes of Noboa’s businesses. That is not subjective, that is not my opinion. That has come out in the media, that has been denounced. Noboa himself has not denied it. Cocaine has been found on repeated occasions in the banana boxes of these companies, in one in particular that is called Noboa Trading.

Now, for some time Noboa denied that he was the owner of Noboa Trading, but rather said that it was the company of a cousin of his father. Today we know that Noboa lied because the Pandora Papers —a series of “whistleblowers,” first the Panama Papers came out, then the Paradise Papers, now these— it comes out that Noboa is owner of an offshore company, and that it is owner in turn of 51% of the shares of Noboa Trading. That is to say, the majority partner is President Noboa through his offshore which is of his entire property in Panama. So, that came out and Noboa has tried to avoid the issue.

He has not commented on this because, moreover, Ecuadorian law prevents public officials, including those of popular election, from having companies, goods, capital, assets, in short, in tax havens. And Panama, —until last month or until two months ago, because Noboa took it off the list— was on the list of tax havens recognized by the tax authority of Ecuador.

So, his election under this norm, as president of the Republic, is illegal. When Noboa was a candidate he had not only that but many more offshore companies. This company is called Lanfranco Holding, and he had many more in the world. So, that is why Noboa does not comment on it, but it is suspicious that he has even denied the ownership of the company in which cocaine is repeatedly found. In those banana boxes cocaine has been found. Both on the Ecuadorian side and on the destination side, there have been various investigations, police operations, that have found drugs in banana boxes. It seems to me that the last one with boxes of Noboa I would have to check, but it was in Turkey, and there have been in banana boxes in Rotterdam, in London, in Spain, in short, it is something recurrent.

Aside from that there is an even greater scandal, because the person who has been repeatedly detained, who is the one who exercises the anti-narcotics control in Noboa’s company, has been freed after being repeatedly detained by a lawyer, his lawyer, who is a member of Noboa’s cabinet.

So, there a thorough investigation is required, hopefully an investigative journalism investigation. There is no such investigative journalism in Ecuador at this moment, they are all subsumed to power, I believe they are afraid. The Noboa government has been very authoritarian. I believe that some journalists simply believe in that iron-fist approach because it is against the left, against correísmo, against the Indigenous movement, etc., etc. Others perhaps have greater ethics and would like to do it, but until now they have not had the courage, the bravery, the strength, the means to be able to do this investigation. The investigations that exist unfortunately are, for now, exclusively international including, I insist, that of the Pandora Papers.

Q: The Venezuelan economy is, in large part, dollarized de facto. Ecuador is a country officially dollarized. Do you believe that this monetary process can help stabilize the economy of Venezuela, and in the long run growth and development?

A: No, I prefer not to opine on whether Venezuela should or should not dollarize. There are various advantages and disadvantages. I know that de facto at this moment there is a strong process of dollarization that is happening in Venezuela. It certainly kills inflation and devaluation, without any doubt.

There are different types of dollarization. There are processes that are more akin to convertibility, there are temporary dollarizations, definitive ones, in short. I would not want to opine on this, this is a decision of the Venezuelan people and moreover I am not an economist, and I do not believe it pertains to me.

Q: You are a diplomatic adviser for the Hague Group. A good part of our audience surely does not know about it. What is the group? And what is your role?

A: The Hague Group is a diplomatic group of States, of countries, that have joined together to coordinate, to make international law be respected, and that crimes in the Gaza Strip especially and in Palestine in general be put to an end. So it is a group of countries dedicated to the struggle for the human rights of Palestinians, for the respect, I insist, of international law that exists regarding the Gaza Strip and Palestine.

It was created in January of this year. Nine states came together to ask that international law be respected. International law exists, there is no lack of legal, juridical clarity, about the situation in Gaza and in Palestine. We have the resolutions of the United Nations, we have advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, but in practice this international law is not complied with, is not applied. The countries are violating their own commitments, which they themselves have acquired, their legal obligations before international law.

So, a group of countries, somewhat taking inspiration from the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, decided, instead of acting in an isolated way and declaring policies to comply with international law unilaterally, they decided to come together in a diplomatic bloc. It is called the Hague Group, in order to articulate themselves and have greater effectiveness. Of course, we know that collective action of states maximizes effectiveness, right? It becomes more visible, you can coordinate policy, you can learn from one another. And moreover the states are protected from possible punishments, from retaliations.

We have seen a very aggressive Trump administration, imposing sanctions, even on special rapporteurs of the United Nations, and now also on judges of the International Criminal Court. That is to say, it is a very aggressive administration in that sense and it is only through collective action that these States can be defended. So, by joining in a group the collective is protected. They cannot attack them individually, but rather there is a coalition of States that is called the Hague Group.

From its beginnings, with these nine countries last January, in a few months it has been consolidating. First three measures were announced. It is very important to say it, the Hague Group does not make calls, it takes concrete measures. What are these measures? The compliance with the arrest warrants decreed by the International Criminal Court; the embargo on the sale of weapons; and not allowing ships that transport weapons for Israel, weapons that are going to be used in the genocide, to dock in their ports. Those were the three initial measures.

Later, afterward in the Bogotá conference, which was very important and which was attended not by nine countries, nine countries but rather 31 States, it was extended to six measures and much more precise ones, moreover. They also have to do with the embargo on the sale of weapons; the issue of the ports; the issue of the flags so that countries do not have ships that are using their flags transporting military material to Israel; the issue of public investment, that there not be public purchases nor public investment in companies and in territories that have to do with the genocide. And also what we call measures of accountability or responsibility for war crimes. That war criminals also be sanctioned and that there be mechanisms of universal jurisdiction activated in each one of the States that join these measures.

We have just had in September, on the margin of the General Assembly of the United Nations, also a very important meeting of the Hague Group now with 35 countries. It is important to note that not only countries of the global South participated, but also various European countries, not necessarily members of the group but participating in the meetings such as Spain, Ireland, Malta. We have countries of four continents of the world: Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia. This began with a conversation among three States, South Africa, Malaysia and Colombia, and that indeed like a snowball has been growing, so that international law is complied with.

And how is international law made to be complied with? Not through exhortations, but through concrete measures, through actions, because all the States have already voted or many of them have supported, have voted on resolutions that order concrete measures. It is these concrete measures that the Hague Group seeks to land in practice, that they be complied with, that there be application of international law. Because if not multilateralism, the United Nations, serve for nothing, right?

I would finish by saying that the Hague Group plays that double purpose: on one hand the defense of the human rights of Palestinians, facing the crimes that have been committed in these last two years by Israel. But also, I would say in a more indirect way, we are talking about a defense of international law per se, of multilateralism per se, now that multilateralism is very attacked by exceptionalism, by unilateralism, by swaggering I would say, of certain actors that try to undermine the global social contract that some of us continue seeking to build.