Editorial
Guacamaya, March 6, 2025. Economic sanctions against Venezuela hurt the livelihoods of those of us here, do not promote democracy, and do not benefit the United States. It is time to say it loud and clear, without nuance: these measures must end.
Some debate whether it is better to discuss the continuity of Chevron’s license or the need to reform the sanctions regime. However, the reality is that these measures indiscriminately affect the entire population, regardless of social status. They do not contribute to a political solution but instead deepen the conflict. Therefore, the call to lift them should be a common ground for all who live in Venezuela, at least out of self-interest.
Calling for an end to sanctions does not mean ignoring legitimate demands for political, civil, and human rights, for democracy and freedom of expression, or for decent public services. On the contrary: opposing sanctions means advocating for a prosperous Venezuela.
It is senseless and unjust for Venezuelan society to continue paying the social and economic costs of sanctions due to the government’s actions. A people already battered by years of crisis do not deserve further punishment because of political conflict.
The world is full of authoritarian regimes, and many are allies of the United States. Egypt, for example, has received over $200 billion in aid from Washington D.C. since 1975, while its rulers—mostly military men—have been far from democratic. Yet, for them, there are no sanctions, only rewards.
If the real interest is the well-being of Venezuelans and not political punishment, then the path is clear: the end of sanctions must be immediate.
Sanctions Attack the Lives of Venezuelans
Let us not lose sight of how economic sanctions work. Their purpose, in most cases, is to collapse the economy so that the population turns against its government. However, this often leads to two scenarios: increased repression by the ruling elite or a society so preoccupied with survival that it cannot even protest.
The case of Venezuela is a clear example. Oil sales through PDVSA sustain both public spending and the private sector, as 95% of the country’s foreign currency income comes from oil revenues. This has been the case for decades, since Venezuela became a rentier state.
For this reason, the first Trump administration cut off the Venezuelan state from international financial institutions and prohibited key transactions, especially to do with PDVSA, the country’s golden goose.
What was the goal? To almost completely cut off state revenues. And, given that Venezuela is an oil-dependent rentier state, to deliver a fatal blow to the entire economy—one that was already severely weakened in 2017 by mismanagement of public funds and falling oil prices. These facts should not be controversial: what other outcome could be expected from drastically slashing a country’s income?
Although the sanctions target the state, they also dealt a severe blow to the private sector. Foreign currency from oil revenues stopped flowing into the exchange market, while contracts with the country’s main industry were canceled. And if the public sector also loses purchasing power, it inevitably affects the private sector.
The only thing that saved Venezuela was the initiative of its people, who refused to give up. A private sector that filled the gaps where the state could no longer provide. They made do with nothing, starting businesses and working under far-from-ideal conditions. And so they made it to 2025, but this is not how a society prospers.
From the first Trump administration, the devastating impact of sanctions was already known. Thomas Shannon, then Deputy Secretary of State, warned in The Washington Post: “I said the sanctions were going to grind the Venezuelan economy into dust and have huge human consequences, one of which would be out-migration.”
This strategy—suffocating a country’s economy to force political change—is not new. It has been used in wars since ancient times, especially when a great power cannot subdue a smaller adversary. Richard Nixon himself made it clear with his order against Salvador Allende’s Chile: “Make the economy scream!”
Sanctions Do Not Help Democracy, On the Contrary
By 2025, sanctions against Venezuela no longer aim to “topple the regime.” That maximum pressure policy failed: it brought greater misery without any political gain.
Today, sanctions function more as a tool to keep the country as an economic protectorate, but not even in the service of Washington D.C.’s interests. In fact, they also harm U.S. oil companies.
After all is said and done, they seem to respond more to the interests of the most failed exile group in history: the Cuban exiles, who have turned the Venezuelan issue into a mere electoral bone for Florida’s political hounds.
The facts confirm it: Nicolás Maduro remains in Miraflores. Nor have sanctions worked to overthrow regimes in Iran, Cuba, or North Korea, no matter how harsh or prolonged they are.
According to journalist Marc Caputo in Axios, three Republican congressmen from Florida pressured Trump to revoke the “Chevron license,” threatening to vote against his Reconciliation Bill. “They’re crazy, and I need their votes,” the leader of the “free world” reportedly said. Their names are Mario Diaz-Balart, Carlos Giménez, and María Elvira Salazar.
This is the greatest danger of sanctions on Venezuela: its “Cubanization.” Where will the country end up if it maintains the same government and the same economic blockade for over 60 years? Those who call for sanctions, is this what they dream of?
It is no coincidence that these three congressmen and the Secretary of State are of Cuban origin, though that is not the point. None of them, nor their parents, suffered under the Castro regime, as they never lived under the Revolution. The point is that, as good opportunists, they have built their political careers on the back of the Cuban conflict. They know the infamous blockade does not work to change regimes, but they maintain it because it is a political business. And if they have not achieved more, it is because, according to them, there is still not enough blockade.
Returning to Venezuela, have there been improvements in democratic quality since we have sanctions? Or rather, do we have a government clinging to power tooth and nail? The answer is evident: the internationalization of the Venezuelan conflict does not help to resolve it; on the contrary, it perpetuates and turns it into a lucrative business for a handful of opportunists.
Sanctions Undermine U.S. Interests
Suppose I do not care what happens in Venezuela, because I am looking out for U.S. interests. What, then, have sanctions meant for me?
Let’s start with a purely commercial issue. Refineries on the Gulf Coast used to be supplied with heavy Venezuelan crude, at one point over 1 million barrels per day. Well, they can always buy it from other countries, even if it costs a bit more—though not from U.S. production, which does not produce such heavy crudes.
But then we reach a strategic point. If the U.S. removes itself from the market, or by extension the entire West, others will buy Venezuelan crude at larger discounts. It is a simple law of the market. From 2019 to 2022, Chinese companies could ask for discounts of up to $35 per barrel, which could easily be 50% of the initial price.
The U.S. has the advantage that, in Venezuela, the oil industry still largely uses its technology and methods. This has created a dependency between the heavy oil producer and the importer. The U.S. is a net importer of crude but a net exporter of refined products, let us make that clear.
However, as time passes under sanctions, Chinese, Russian, and Iranian companies are gaining ground. Unlike Europe, Canada, or India, they can operate despite sanctions, independent of Washington D.C.’s directives.
We have already seen Tehran provide the vital diluents needed to process extra-heavy crude from the Orinoco Oil Belt, and carry out repairs in refineries and upgraders. Since the “Chevron License” came into effect, Americans have regained that space, but Trump does not see it as strategically useful, or so it seems.
We will see what happens with the oil fields now that OFAC licenses are ending. Will European and American companies leave? If they do, barrel production will undoubtedly fall in the short term. But who will be the new owners? Will it be PDVSA on its won? Perhaps the Turkish, Russian, Iranian, and Chinese companies that arrived last year to explore upstream opportunities will take advantage of the discounts. “The gringos are leaving, 50% off on all fields,” a sign in El Tigre, a town at the heart of the Orinoco Oil Belt, might say tomorrow.
How is this discount materialized? Well, there are Productive Participation Contracts (CPP) under the Anti-Blockade Law. Under the CPP, private investors can take up to half of the crude produced to sell it themselves. Chinese, Turkish, Brazilian, North American, and European companies have already signed such contracts. Of course, if the White House shuts the door, some will have to cancel them, while others will not find it necessary.
Sanctions do not benefit Venezuelans, neither economically nor politically. Nor do they benefit U.S. interests. Only a few opportunists who thrive on conflict and suffering can take advantage of them. Those of us living in Venezuela can only say one thing about economic sanctions: they must end now.