The draft resolution did not pass: it received four votes in favor (Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia), nine against (Denmark, France, Greece, Panama, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and two abstentions (Guyana and South Korea itself). Photo: UN PHOTO
Guacamaya, September 19, 2025. On September 19, the UN Security Council voted on a draft resolution presented by the Republic of Korea, in its capacity as Council president, which sought to continue sanctions relief imposed on Iran under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The text did not pass: it received four votes in favor (Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia), nine against (Denmark, France, Greece, Panama, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and two abstentions (Guyana and South Korea itself).
The defeat of the draft means that, absent a new agreement, UN sanctions on Tehran will automatically be reimposed at the end of the 30-day deadline, on September 28.
From Failed Negotiations to the Return of “Maximum Pressure”
The United States and Iran attempted to resume indirect talks to restore the nuclear deal, but these failed in 2022. Over time, restrictions under the JCPOA expired, including those related to Iran’s missile program in October 2023, known as “Transition Day.” However, European countries maintained their own national sanctions, arguing that Tehran continued failing to meet its commitments.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 hardened the scenario: Washington reactivated its “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, even while holding bilateral talks to explore a new deal.
In June, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a resolution declaring Iran in violation of its safeguards obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Weeks later, Israeli and U.S. strikes hit Iranian nuclear facilities. In response, Iran’s parliament passed a law suspending cooperation with the IAEA, depriving the agency of access to its facilities.
The E3 vs. Tehran
European officials warned that the lack of monitoring, combined with highly enriched uranium reserves whose whereabouts are unknown after the strikes, poses a grave proliferation risk. The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) threatened to activate the sanctions snapback mechanism at the end of August, ensuring the process would conclude in October, just as Russia—an Iranian ally—assumes the Security Council presidency.
Iran flatly rejected the warning. In a July 20 letter, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi argued that the Europeans had forfeited their status as JCPOA participants due to “flagrant violations” of their own commitments, invalidating any reactivation. Tehran insists it never received the promised economic benefits after the U.S. withdrawal and accuses Europeans of aligning with Washington by maintaining national sanctions and backing critical IAEA resolutions. Iranian officials even warned that if the snapback were activated, they might leave the NPT.
China and Russia backed these objections, with Moscow arguing that the E3 had failed to exhaust the required Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM). Analysts suggest that if new sanctions are imposed, Beijing and Moscow could challenge the reconstitution of the defunct Sanctions Committee 1737 and the appointment of an expert panel, thus stalling implementation.
Last-Minute Negotiations
European diplomacy intensified in September. On the 17th, the E3 foreign ministers and EU High Representative Kaja Kallas held a call with Araghchi. According to sources, the consultation yielded no progress. Shortly after, the German Foreign Ministry stated that Iran “still has not taken reasonable and precise measures” to secure an extension of Resolution 2231, reiterating its “determination to proceed with the reimposition of sanctions if no concrete steps are taken in the coming days.”
As Council president, South Korea then scheduled the vote for the following morning. The prior calculation was that at least three countries—China, Russia, and Pakistan—would vote in favor, while eight—Denmark, France, Greece, Panama, South Korea, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—would reject it, either by voting against or abstaining. If the text had secured nine votes, a U.S. veto was expected.
In parallel, China and Russia “blue-circulated” on August 28 an alternative draft extending the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 for six months, until April 18, 2026.
Immediate Reactions
Following Friday’s vote, Iran’s UN ambassador, Amir Saeid Iravani, called the decision “hasty, unnecessary, and illegal.” Tehran, he said, “recognizes no obligation to implement it,” denouncing a “policy of coercion.”
Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, by contrast, welcomed the outcome, arguing that Iran’s nuclear program “is not peaceful” and that the international objective must remain to “prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities.” “A nuclear-armed Iran would mean the most dangerous regime possessing the most dangerous weapon,” he warned, “dramatically undermining global stability and security.”
The Role of the IAEA and a Pending New Deal
In early July, Iran suspended cooperation with the IAEA following Israeli and U.S. strikes on its nuclear facilities that began on June 12. However, last week it reached an agreement with the agency to restart cooperation. The deal requires Iran to submit a report on the state of the attacked facilities and to open negotiations for organizing future on-site inspections.
At the end of August, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set the tone: the conflict with the United States is “unsolvable.” According to him, Washington does not seek genuine understanding, but an “obedient” Iran—something the Iranian people will resist “with all their strength.”
In this context, reformist sectors attempted a risky move with their “National Reconciliation” proposal: releasing political prisoners, reforming state media, restoring public trust, and even suspending uranium enrichment in exchange for full sanctions relief. The result was devastating. Hardliners branded the proposal as “treason” and equated it with surrender to Netanyahu and Trump. More strikingly, many reformists—and even Masoud Pezeshkian’s own government—quickly distanced themselves, aligning with hardline criticism.
The lesson many reformists convey is clear: Washington offers no credible exits nor incentives. Even full capitulation to Western demands would not guarantee Iran protection from renewed pressure or threats to the current elite’s hold on power. Hence the growing conviction that if Tehran seeks serious investment and security guarantees, it must demonstrate strategic coherence with Beijing.
Restructuring of Power
A key development abroad is the appointment of Ali Larijani as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, coinciding with the creation of a new Defense Council—the first since the Iran-Iraq War.
These moves signal a long-term redesign of Iran’s power architecture, not just immediate crisis management of the nuclear standoff and tensions with the EU, the United States, Israel, and their allies.
At the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, President Pezeshkian embraced China’s multipolar agenda and proposed Chabahar port as a logistics hub for Beijing’s interests.
Xi Jinping responded with strong backing: reaffirming Iran’s right to nuclear energy and, alongside Russia, condemning Israeli and U.S. strikes. Both countries also committed to “maximum implementation” of their 25-year cooperation agreement.
For years, Iran treated China as a fallback option, leaning on Beijing only when Western agreements failed to materialize. A case in point was Xi’s much-touted 2016 economic package, which went nowhere because Tehran then prioritized Europe and the U.S.
Today, the situation is different. Even reformists now agree that anchoring in China is inevitable, as various experts on Iran’s internal situation have highlighted. It is no longer a tactical game to gain leverage vis-à-vis the West, but an increasingly determined strategic orientation.
Rising pressure—sanctions, UN snapback mechanisms, military strikes, and threats of war—could end up consolidating precisely what Washington seeks to prevent: an even closer and more durable Tehran–Beijing axis.
What was once a “maximum pressure” policy aimed at containment risks accelerating a geopolitical shift with structural consequences across the Middle East and Central Asia. We have already seen similar cases with Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, countries with which Iran has also increased cooperation.
Broader Pattern and Lessons for Venezuela
The Iranian case shows a clear pattern: U.S. maximum pressure and the absence of realistic “off-ramps” push sanctioned regimes toward a strategic realignment in which China, and to a lesser extent Russia, cease being tactical allies and become structural anchors for ruling elites. This deepens geopolitical dependence but also contributes to consolidating an axis of sanctioned states increasingly effective at evading such measures, undermining multilateral sanctions regimes such as the one imposed on North Korea by the UN Security Council.
The creation of new defense councils in Iran reflects how international pressure reshapes elites. In Venezuela, the militarization of politics and the expansion of military agreements with Russia and Iran have a similar effect: consolidating a cohesive power core that perceives external pressure as existential.
The key lesson for Venezuela is that sanctions do not necessarily foster internal openings but instead consolidate dependence on powers rivaling the West—turning China into the guarantor of long-term economic and political stability. In Venezuela’s case, China is the main buyer of oil from a mono-productive economy. Additionally, sanctions reduce the influence of reformist sectors within power circles and erode trust among actors to reach agreements and uphold guarantees.
