Photograph of the videoconference between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Nicolás Maduro. Presidential Press.
Guacamaya, March 15, 2025. Amid the war in Ukraine, the rapprochement between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, and the dispute over the Essequibo region, Venezuela and Russia finalized a strategic partnership agreement that combines anti-fascist rhetoric.
This agreement has antecedents that include energy projects in disputed zones, space cooperation, and the possibility of a return to a scenario of “maximum pressure” on Venezuela. It reveals an alliance that challenges the West at a time of international pressures on Caracas and has implications for the geopolitical balance in Latin America.
Anti-Fascist Rhetoric and Historical Legitimization
During the videoconference between Vladimir Putin and Nicolás Maduro, both leaders elevated their relationship to the “level of a strategic partnership,” based on a “shared vision of the world.” Maduro, evoking 80 years of diplomatic relations, highlighted Venezuela’s support for the USSR during World War II:
“80 years ago, our country modestly added its voice from the homeland of Bolívar to support what was the Great Victory against Nazi-fascism,” stated the Venezuelan leader. This discourse will materialize with a monument to the Red Army in Caracas, a gesture that aligns Venezuela with Russia’s anti-fascist narrative, inspired by the “political myth of the German Democratic Republic (GDR),” as analyzed by Raina Zimmering.
According to Zimmering, anti-fascism in East Germany linked capitalism and fascism to justify national cohesion under a shared identity and worldview. Russia and Venezuela replicate this approach, as seen when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov denounced in a telegram the “fight against neo-Nazism and neocolonial practices” in his communication with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yvan Gil, while Maduro accuses the U.S. of “distorting historical truth.” This narrative not only seeks to legitimize both governments internally but also to project an image of global resistance against what they describe as an oppressive Western order.
Military Cooperation and Power Theater: Nuclear Submarines in the Caribbean
It is important to recall that in a calculated move, Russia deployed the Northern Fleet, including the nuclear submarine Kazan, in Venezuelan waters in 2024, coinciding with the start of Maduro’s electoral campaign and a day after the Venezuelan government announced the resumption of negotiations with the U.S. This deployment, presented as “joint exercises,” sent a clear message: Moscow supports Maduro against external pressures, as it did in 2020 by investigating “Operation Gideon,” a claim by both governments about “destabilization with U.S. mercenaries in Venezuela,” which Russia brought to the UN Security Council for discussion.
Putin also invited Maduro to the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow, reinforcing the symbolic-military bond. This year’s parade will have special significance, as Russia hopes that the Trump administration’s overtures will allow an end to the Ukraine war on terms acceptable to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Atlantic alliance between the U.S. and the European Union is rapidly deteriorating.
For Maduro, the invitation allows him to break the isolation that parts of Latin America and the political West seem to have tried to impose again after the 2024 presidential elections. It also shows that he has allies at a time when Venezuela seeks and needs them, especially as Western energy companies may exit the country under U.S. orders.
Energy and Geopolitics: Rosneft, Chevron, Dragon Field, and Essequibo
The energy alliance has been key. In 2019, according to Reuters, Rosneft absorbed 62% of Venezuela’s oil exports, saving PDVSA from collapse due to sanctions. Rosneft was crucial in the scheme to evade sanctions imposed on PDVSA by the U.S. that year, in what has been called a “maximum pressure scenario.”
Although Rosneft withdrew in 2020 due to U.S. pressure, it transferred its assets to the Russian state, maintaining Moscow’s interests in the region. According to Bloomberg, in 2019 Rosneft considered entering Block 5 of the Deltana Platform, near where ExxonMobil explores in disputed waters, an area Maduro promised to defend from “interventionists” and which Venezuela considers its own.
In 2019, Reuters reported that Venezuela modified an agreement to exempt Rosneft from taxes in the Patao and Mejillones gas fields near the Gulf of Paria on the maritime border with Trinidad and Tobago, though this was not finalized.
Rosneft’s exit in 2020 was a significant turning point, followed by the approval of licenses by the former U.S. administration under President Joe Biden for Western companies like Chevron, Spain’s Repsol, Italy’s ENI, and France’s Maurel & Prom, helping Western players regain space in Venezuela’s energy market.
A key fact to measure Russia’s importance to Venezuela is that before the Ukraine war, the Russian financial system managed nearly 60% of Venezuela’s exports, according to Ecoanalítica, and later delivered cash dollars to PDVSA.
From Rosneft to Chevron
Chevron became PDVSA’s most important partner, a space previously occupied by Rosneft. This means a U.S. company took the place of a Russian one in Venezuela’s energy market amid the Ukraine war, a significant detail reflecting geopolitical intentions with the use of oil licenses.
The recent cancellation of Chevron’s license by the U.S. has raised concerns, as the void left by Western companies could reaffirm the presence of actors like Russia, China, or Iran. However, only China might have the economic muscle to do so.
In Trinidad and Tobago, the government and Shell, which has an OFAC license to explore and extract natural gas in the Dragon Field on the maritime border between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, also face uncertainty over a possible revocation. The Trinidad and Tobago government has been in contact with the U.S. administration to avoid a revocation and the suspension of gas exploitation.
Maduro plays a double game: in the past, he granted concessions to Rosneft and later sought to negotiate licenses in Qatar for Western companies to work in the gas field, projects abandoned after the Russian oil company’s exit, all to maintain bridges with Washington without breaking with Moscow, a key ally in critical moments.
Russia and the Essequibo Conflict
Russia has described the Essequibo conflict as a “colonial legacy,” criticizing U.S. and British military support and presence in Guyana. The Stabroek Block holds 11 billion barrels of crude and is key for ExxonMobil.
It is pertinent to recall that in 2008, when Hugo Chávez was president, Venezuela recognized the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which declared independence during the Georgia war with Russian support. Chávez called the conflict a “NATO aggression against Russia.” Today, with the Ukraine war, Maduro avoids recognizing the Donetsk and Lugansk republics, balancing his alliance with Putin and the need not to alienate Europe entirely in future negotiations, given Venezuela’s energy needs, which have gained importance since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
However, amid tensions between Caracas and Washington, a delegation from the Republic of Crimea, led by Gennadiy Murádov, Vice President of the Crimean Council of Ministers, arrived in Caracas on March 4 to “boost interregional cooperation between Russia and Venezuela.” The visit included strategic meetings to explore and develop joint initiatives in areas of mutual interest, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry.
In early 2014, after the “Euromaidan,” a series of protests and events that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, tensions arose in Crimea, a region with a predominantly Russian-speaking population that began to clash with the new authorities in Kyiv.
Russian and pro-Russian forces took control of strategic points in Crimea, including the naval base in Sevastopol, a key location in the Black Sea.
A referendum followed, unrecognized by most of the international community, in which the majority of voters supported joining Russia. Russia then formalized the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, creating the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol as Russian federal entities.
In contrast, Russia argues its sovereignty over Crimea and since 2014 has sought international support and diplomatic recognition, as Moscow claims the annexation was conducted in accordance with international law.
On several occasions, the Venezuelan government has called for an end to the Ukraine war that began in 2022 and has officially declared itself “neutral.” However, the strategic partnership between Russia and Venezuela has deepened in various fields, from the economy, defense, oil, and space exploration to culture.
Trump-Putin: A New Scenario for Venezuela?
Trump’s “America First” policy also prioritizes protecting U.S. investments like ExxonMobil’s in Guyana, which could increase tensions with Maduro. The license to Shell suggests Caracas seeks to position itself as a “viable energy partner” for the West and the Trump administration, at least that is what Maduro has implied despite the tension generated by the Chevron license cancellation, without relying exclusively on Russia.
Space Cooperation Between Russia and Venezuela in a Context of Space Militarization: The New Strategic Frontier
After losing access to the French Guiana Spaceport in 2022 due to the Ukraine conflict, Russia seeks alternatives near the equator for its launches and space activities. In April 2022, it signed a Space Cooperation Agreement with Venezuela, and in September 2024 extended its network with Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Algeria. Yuri Borisov, then head of the Russian Space Agency, promotes the construction of spaceports in “friendly” countries, taking advantage of the equatorial position for more efficient launches. This project occurs in a context of space militarization, a key arena in the rivalry with NATO, especially after France’s launch of the CAO-3 military satellite from the French Guiana Spaceport, located hours away from the Essequibo territory and Venezuela, all within the region known as the Guiana Shield (Guyana, Suriname, Venezuela, and French Guiana).
Russian space cooperation with Venezuela includes “joint projects” that, according to officials from both countries, span defense, technological development, education, and energy, though details are scarce. This aims to reinforce Russia’s power projection in Latin America, something the U.S. has viewed with concern.
In this sense, space cooperation in a context of space militarization, which has become another arena of dispute among powers, is an element that deserves attention in the current global scenario.
Maduro Between Moscow and Washington
Russia consolidates itself as Maduro’s indispensable strategic ally: it provides political support, was key in evading sanctions through Rosneft, and offers an anti-fascist ideological platform with which Caracas can align and gain international sympathy. However, Venezuela does not renounce negotiating with the U.S., as shown by its 2024 dialogue and the visit of Richard Grenell, Special Envoy for Venezuela and North Korea under President Donald Trump. Indeed, in most cases when negotiations between Venezuela and the U.S. are announced, Moscow shows some form of support for Caracas.
Another example is Grenell’s announcement yesterday that deportation flights of Venezuelan migrants to Venezuela will resume. The Venezuelan government had announced the end of this cooperation program after the U.S. canceled Chevron’s license to operate in Venezuela. However, this seems to reveal that talks between Washington and Caracas have continued despite recent tensions. Thus, on the morning of March 14, Putin and Maduro held a videoconference at an important moment when the “maximum pressure” scenario on Venezuela seems to gain strength. Moscow makes its support clear, and unlike in 2019, Russia comes with extensive experience in evading Western sanctions during the Ukraine war. That support was crucial for Venezuela and could eventually be so again. This resurgence of alliances among sanctioned nations is not new in history, as seen in cases like Rhodesia with South Africa and Portugal. Such alliances often render such measures ineffective.
It is worth considering that Russia faces its own limitations. Despite not being able to provide broad support in the case of Syria, Moscow seems able to maintain its military presence there. It has also announced the construction of a naval base in Sudan, giving it access to the Red Sea, a key route for global trade. Additionally, in the strategic Gulf of Oman, near the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow entrance to the Persian Gulf through which a fifth of the world’s traded crude oil flows, China, Iran, and Russia recently conducted joint exercises under the name “Maritime Security Belt 2025.”
Meanwhile, the invitation to Maduro for an in-person meeting with Putin in Moscow for the Victory Day parade marks another show of support and reaffirms Russia as a global power. This comes in a year when the Venezuelan government seeks to push a constitutional reform that could shape the country’s future and raises questions.
For his part, Maduro turns again to Russia, his most important ally in critical moments, as happened in 2019, before and after the 2024 elections, when Putin was among the first heads of state to recognize Maduro and invite him to the BRICS Summit in Kazan, where Brazil vetoed Venezuela’s entry into the bloc. However, Russia publicly expressed its disagreement with Lula da Silva’s government. In this context, Russian support remains important, even if the international scenario is not the same as before.
In a Fractured World and a Broken International Order, Maduro Navigates Between Two Waters
In a fractured world and a broken international order, Maduro navigates between two waters: using oil as a shield and geopolitical alliances as a bargaining chip to achieve his goals. The question is whether this scenario of increased sanctions and the exit of Western companies from Venezuela will lead to a renewed preponderant role for Russia amid a globalized war, where Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East, trade wars, armed conflicts in Africa, European rearmament, the Essequibo conflict, the struggle for Arctic resources, tensions in the Asia-Pacific, sanctions, and space militarization are all pieces of the same geopolitical puzzle from which Venezuela cannot escape.
