Stalin González in his office at the Caracas headquarters of his party, Un Nuevo Tiempo. Photo: Elías Ferrer.
Guacamaya, May 11, 2025. We speak with Stalin González, a leader of the opposition party Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT), led by Manuel Rosales, governor of Zulia State. We meet at the party’s office in Caracas.
He has just arrived from a campaign event in Catia, in western Caracas, for the elections on May 25. The National Assembly and the governorships of the country’s 24 states are being contested. He is running as a candidate for parliament through the national list.
He is worried that many citizens still don’t know about the elections, with only two weeks left. He suspects that this may be the intention of the ruling party, to avoid facing high opposition turnout.
The son of trade unionists, he grew up in Catia and La Candelaria. He was given the first and middle names Iván Stalin in honor of Soviet communist leaders. He studied at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV), where he emerged as a leader of the student movement. In 2007, they opposed and abruptly halted Hugo Chávez’s proposed constitutional reform in a referendum.
Stalin González soon became a key negotiator, participating in dialogues between the Venezuelan opposition, Maduro’s government, and the United States on multiple occasions. This topic becomes the main focus of this interview.
Question: The Venezuelan opposition has called for abstention several times. This time, it seems they have more compelling reasons, especially after July 28. And it’s something I’ve heard a lot in street conversations—that voting won’t change anything. Some even say the government has already prepared results with just a few opposition deputies and governors. So, why vote on May 25?
Answer: Well, the first thing I believe is, as you say in the question, the opposition has used that method before. I think it has never had a favorable result. Though as you mention, there also seem to be strong reasons not to vote this time.
The issue here is that democracy itself is at stake. Democracy as we know it in the world, but especially in Venezuela—there’s a risk with becoming Nicaragua and Cuba. I believe Venezuela is neither Nicaragua nor Cuba. And to prevent that from materializing, if that’s the plan, we must take advantage of any space, window, or opportunity to defend democracy.
I think today’s election should be seen as a process for struggle, to fight back, as an act of rebellion. What’s more rebellious today than going to vote, again, against this government? And an act of resistance. That’s how I see it—abandoning spaces has never been a good plan.
Q: And how can the results be respected?
R: Well, that’s a big doubt we all have. Now, what to do? Keep showing that you’re the majority, keep demonstrating that the country doesn’t want them, keep pushing for institutions to recognize popular sovereignty. The day I went to Bolívar, I said, it can’t be that 200 years after the Angostura speech… when you read the Angostura speech, the first thing Simón Bolívar says is to recognize popular sovereignty. Two hundred years later, we’re still on that. But that’s the fight. What do we do? Stay home? Leave the country? Hide in an embassy? That doesn’t seem like a viable plan.
“I come from a family of trade unionists. No collective bargaining agreement on Earth has been achieved without negotiation and strong protests.”
Q: You’re considered one of the most reliable negotiators between the opposition and Maduro’s government, and you’ve also spoken many times with the U.S. government under different administrations. What has the opposition had to negotiate to participate this May? For example, we‘ve seen that your party, Un Nuevo Tiempo, has a ballot card, but MPV doesn’t.
R: Look, I believe negotiation is part of political practice. I come from a family of trade unionists. And there’s nothing more negotiation-heavy than a union leader. No collective bargaining agreement on Earth has been achieved without negotiation and strong protests. Negotiation is part of politics. Here, it’s misused and discredited when politics is partly about that.
I always say you have to talk to everyone, and I believe people understand each other by talking. It’s better to talk than not to talk. Even in the worst moments, it’s always better to talk.
What did Un Nuevo Tiempo negotiate? Un Nuevo Tiempo had nothing to do with those decisions. Ultimately, those decisions were made by those in power. What we did try to do was uphold the opposition’s struggle over all these years—to have more political parties, more eligible candidates, for people to participate, and to have electoral guarantees. We haven’t strayed from that framework. We see this election, as I told you in the previous question, as a process to fight. And that’s how we’re approaching it. We haven’t done anything outside the opposition’s decalogue of struggle all this time.
Q: What’s the point of being in the National Assembly now? Especially if the opposition is expected to be a minority in deputies amid low turnout.
R: Well, let’s wait until May 25 to see the results. But being there—I think it’s always better to be present. The National Assembly is the body that appoints public powers and approves laws. Every time the opposition hasn’t been in that institution, the government advances.
There’s a big issue here: the constitutional reform the government wants to push. Where will it be discussed? What will be done? That seems to be the scenario where it’ll be debated. Leaving that vacuum for the government to advance doesn’t seem like a good plan. So, I think this assembly will play a key role in the next chapter of the country’s history.
“What I see is that Maduro is ultimately an economically unviable project for Venezuela.”
Q: How could the Venezuelan parliament regain legitimacy and be part of a democratic solution for the country? In peace processes in other countries, like Northern Ireland, it happened mainly through the assembly.
R: I think this assembly will be important for this new phase of history. What issues will be discussed? First, legitimacy must be earned with the people. So, it must discuss what the people need. The country has a serious economic problem. With or without sanctions, the economy is struggling. Without sanctions, we’d recover faster.
This country, for example, must discuss the hydrocarbons law. How can the state, while maintaining ownership of mineral resources, open doors?
I see a comparison. Five or seven years ago, Brazil wasn’t on anyone’s radar in oil. Today, it’s the continent’s top oil producer. Let’s see what reforms Brazil made. Petrobras didn’t disappear, but other players entered the market.
I think these are issues the assembly must discuss—labor laws, income tax laws. There are pending topics to improve Venezuelans’ lives economically.
Q: And how do you see it more in terms of seeking a democratic solution?
R: Well, obviously, the Assembly, Congress, or Parliament is where the country’s political currents should converge, where agreements and consensus should be sought. And I think we must aim for that because what I see is that Maduro is ultimately an economically unviable project for Venezuela.
As long as they’re in power, this will be economically disastrous. But part of the opposition also proposes a politically unviable project to attain power. They seem unlikely to achieve power. How do you build it? Here, concepts like transition and rupture are confused. Transition is talked about as a propaganda concept, but what’s sought is rupture, not transition. Transition is a process, and I think Venezuela is in that process—a process of change that should lead to a political or democratic transition. And the Assembly must discuss that.
Q: Now I want to ask you about something else, a 2020 negotiation with help from Turkey’s then-foreign minister. You were part of Juan Guaidó’s interim government, but there was a split afterward. What was negotiated. And, what is not the same, what was achieved?
R: I think it’s part of the 2019-2020 dynamic. With the 2020 parliamentary elections, we were trying to participate. And I stand by it—it was a mistake not to go to the 2020 election, to hand them the Assembly. It was sold that change would come from outside, and look where we are. It was a mistake not to participate, and at the time, we were trying to get to the election.
We spoke a lot with Turkey’s then-foreign minister, true. We never went to Turkey, as some claimed on social media. Of course, I knew Istanbul and Ankara, but I didn’t go. All meetings were via video call. The then-ambassador, a good friend, Servin, helped in that process.
When you negotiate, it’s not just what’s on the table but the context. Turkey, obviously, has access to the regime and could talk to them.
Through Turkey’s then-foreign minister, we encouraged the government to make necessary openings, just as we spoke with the EU. Josep Borrell sent two people, Mora and Niño, to Caracas to try to get the EU to observe that election.
It didn’t happen then, but it paved the way for the 2021 regional elections, where the opposition could participate. The EU came as observers, and there were some guarantees. That failed process opened the door for 2021 to be much better and for the opposition to join electoral processes.
“Negotiations in this country must be discreet, although that is not the same as secret.”
Q: You were part of the Mexico and Barbados negotiations. Let’s start with the latter. Why didn’t they work? What wasn’t fulfilled? This week, we spoke with Luis Florido, who said the government made it clear they wouldn’t allow María Corina Machado to run, that they’d never hand power to that opposition sector. Yet an agreement was signed between the opposition and government. Is what Florido says true? What failed?
R: Though that process didn’t work, there’s a confidentiality agreement. What do I think? It’s my debate about negotiation processes. Negotiations in this country must be discreet, although that is not the same as secret. I think part of the failure was making it too open to the media because it forces you, as a party, to be tough on the counterpart in public. You can’t soften up or you’ll be accused of things.
To me, that negotiation was a triangle—the U.S. on one side, the government on another, and the opposition on the third. What the government wanted was held by the U.S., not the opposition—the issue of licenses and sanctions. What the opposition wanted was given by the government—election guarantees.
In that triangle, what was the U.S.’s relationship with the opposition? They could be an ally for democracy. Expand it further, and Brazil, Colombia, and others joined…
Q: With Russia as well, right?
R: Yes, Russia was part of the process.
This is a discussion I’ve had with my opposition friends since 2017, the first process in the Dominican Republic. I was the faction leader then, not directly in negotiations, but I led the pre-negotiation in Caracas with civil organizations. That process, as they say, wasn’t major-league. Here, everyone has their interests. What do I think was missing? Less media talk, more focus on what we had, and understanding the government was seeking something.
Everyone talked about legitimacy, but it wasn’t true. The government wasn’t seeking legitimacy through negotiation—it wanted resources. In their view, they lacked resources not due to misgovernance but sanctions. That’s their take; I don’t agree. With less corruption and more democracy, we wouldn’t be in this mess. The mistake was that.
And the opposition’s mistake was believing sanctions were their strength. Sanctions are the U.S.’s strength, not the opposition’s. The opposition’s strength was internal organization—being a credible threat, an alternative. More than a threat, being a power alternative. They didn’t focus on that. They thought sanctions were their strength. Well, look where we are now. The Americans talk about sanctions. Biden and Trump negotiate without the opposition at the table.
Q: Celso Amorim recently told BBC Brazil that the EU not sending observers for July 28 was a mistake. That was a point in the Barbados negotiation. What do you think was missing to finalize that? It was one of the opposition’s demanded guarantees. Do you think the sanctions issue was a precondition that hurt chances for more concessions? Including the EU lifting personal sanctions only on Elvis Amoroso, the National Electoral Council head, which ended the observers’ invitation.
R: I’ll make a comparison—maybe not the most academic. Checkers and chess use the same board, but they’re played differently. Some in the opposition think this is checkers—just capture, capture, pressure. Politics is more like chess—you move a piece and must think three moves ahead.
Here, a pressure lobby was mounted—more sanctions, more U.S. and EU pressure—thinking the government wouldn’t play. The government’s response to that pressure was, “Then you’re not coming.” I’m not justifying the government. Looking back to 2021, too much time passed before 2024. The government realized it wouldn’t win in 2024.
Their analysis was that in 2021, they lost the popular vote but gained more governors by causing division. There was a mistake then—believing the unity card alone could crush everyone. It didn’t.
The government knew it couldn’t win and started demanding resources, saying people didn’t want them because they lacked resources due to sanctions.
A whole lobby persists, believing maximum pressure will finish them. As I once told Trump’s first administration in 2019: Explain to me at the State Department—if 60 years of maximum pressure haven’t solved Cuba, why would it solve Venezuela? I don’t get it.
Ultimately, U.S. politics serves U.S. politics. Some legislators push sanctions to please their voters, not to strengthen Venezuelan democracy. They want votes. That’s the mistake of some in the opposition—believing U.S. politicians want Venezuelans to live well. They want to win their elections.
“My friends, I don’t call them radicals, but intransigents. Because that’s what they really are, they’re never satisfied with anything.”
Q: You were also in the Mexico negotiations. What was the goal then? The “Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People” was proposed, with frozen funds managed by the UN for basic needs like health and education. To me, it sounds like a solution acceptable to all. So why didn’t it happen?
R: You asked about Barbados first, right? To fix something from Barbados 2019—that was the closest we got to an agreement. I think maximum pressure policy killed it—the August 2019 sanctions ended that table. The Mexico session was signed in Barbados, the first Barbados agreement.
The social fund… Look, I think expectations were mismanaged. One, the government talks about 20 billion of frozen funds. That is not true. Where are those 20 billion? They don’t exist. It’s much less.
Two, the link between limited frozen funds, UN bureaucracy, U.S. pressure, and Maduro’s government wanting money outright—it got messy. What seemed beautiful on paper was hard to implement because resources weren’t there, couldn’t be disbursed as intended…
With the UN, there were legal safeguards. This wasn’t a donation—it was Venezuelan money to be managed by Venezuelans through an entity. Everyone tried to politicize it, and it wasn’t feasible as imagined.
Q: Do you think that agreement is still valid or could be a basis for a future deal?
R: I think many elements can be reused. The social agreement, part of it, and that fund must be revived someday. Frozen money—not those amounts, but what exists—can be reinvested in Venezuelans.
There’s an issue with two extremes. The government has proven highly inefficient in public policy. They’re good at holding power but bad at policy. Giving them money to waste isn’t the answer. Without oversight and accountability, how?
But thinking all aid strengthens the regime is also off. CLAP box recipients don’t vote for Maduro. “War bonuses” don’t make people pro-Maduro. Discontent remains. Helping people isn’t strengthening Maduro—I disagree with that theory.
My friends, I don’t call them radicals, but intransigents. Because that’s what they really are, they’re never satisfied with anything. Politics is about helping people. Like it or not, Venezuela has 30 million people. Most are inside. Should those outside help? Yes. Should we work for their return? Absolutely. My sister—I haven’t seen her in five years. My dad has a grandson he’s never met. Migration hurt all families, but most of us are still here.
ENCOVI data from last week (since there’s no official data) says 30 million Venezuelans are in the country. Where’s the majority? Sometimes I think Maduro and part of the opposition want this to become Cuba. Maduro wants total control; some in the opposition want to resist from abroad. Their role should be helping those inside—improving democracy, living conditions. But politics here is dictated by those outside imposing on those inside.
Q: Do you think Maduro and Trump are negotiating now? What could they be discussing? After Trump ended oil licenses and accused Maduro of “invading” with Tren de Aragua terrorists.
R: I think each is playing domestic politics. Trump’s pitch was migration and “Great America.” The Tren de Aragua talk? Justifying his migration policy. None of us are investigators, but it’s about migration. Repatriation flights for some, deportations for others. “Great America” is his domestic angle. What are they discussing? Flights keep arriving weekly—so they’re talking.
There must be energy talks because it all comes down to energy. AI discussions too—it uses 10x more power than a Google search. You need more energy.
I saw Richard Grenell’s tweet accusing current policies of strengthening China with the Amuay refinery. My interest is Venezuelans—not the U.S., China, or Russia. This country has the world’s largest oil reserves but can’t extract or sell them. How do we sell? To whom?
I think they’re discussing migration—Trump’s campaign promise, fulfilled his way. It serves Maduro’s narrative of “rescuing” Venezuelans who left due to sanctions. Both use it for their stories. They must be discussing oil. How much progress? I don’t know—that’s speculation.
“I doubt future negotiations will be done abroad.”
Q: How crucial has the U.S. been in past negotiations? Some say without them, Maduro wouldn’t negotiate with the opposition. Where does that leave the opposition without U.S. or other foreign support?
R: For 200 years, the international community has influenced this country’s history. Francisco de Miranda sought British help for independence. Bolívar turned to the British against Spain.
Today, in a globalized world post-WWII, international integration plays a role—but no one will solve our problems for us. Believing a U.S. aircraft carrier will fix this is false. Six years of that tale.
Yes, they play a negotiation role. But strength lies in being an alternative inside. I disagree that the opposition’s strength is sanctions. That’s not it.
Q: How do we ensure international support strengthens sovereignty without creating dependency?
R: We must seriously work to solve our problems. The country needs an agreement—our vision is a democratic one under the Constitution.
The international community should accompany—without interference. Not just the U.S., but also China, Russia, none. I don’t see interference, but we need everyone’s respect. If Venezuela improves, many benefit. Better economy? Less migration. Stronger oil industry? More oil for all. That’s their interest.
We don’t have to sell oil only to the U.S.—China, Turkey, Europe, whoever. But we need strong institutions, credibility, and a stable economy.
The international community must accompany—maybe as guarantors, I’m not sure on terms—but they must participate. The solution, though, is ours. For example, I doubt future negotiations will be done abroad. This assembly should seek agreements here—with international presence, fine.
Most global conflicts are resolved internally with international accompaniment. After past lessons, I doubt external talks will work again.
Q: So, not in the Dominican Republic—in Caracas. So far, they’ve mostly been abroad.
R: This is personal, but external ones haven’t worked.
“Part of the problem is not believing in the idea of a transition—only rupture.”
Q: Brazil said it’s willing to support the process again—Amorim’s statement three days ago.
R: I agree. Brazil and Colombia must be involved—they’re neighbors. Brazil is key in American integration, like Mexico—Latin American giants. The EU and others should also join.
But understand: Colombia and Brazil are allies of Venezuelan democracy, not the opposition. That’s the difference. Accompaniers should strengthen internal processes, not take sides. Lula, as he’s shown, is a Venezuelan democracy ally—not a faction’s.
Q: Last question—the 2007 generation. A student group that led protests against RCTV’s closure and Chávez’s constitutional amendment. The opposition stopped Chávez’s reform then. You’re among the few leaders from that movement still in the country. What lessons from that victory apply today? With another constitutional reform coming, what’s your plan?
R: The processes aren’t the same—much has changed. In 2005, the opposition boycotted parliamentary elections after the 2004 recall. In 2006, Manuel Rosales ran, and Chávez won big. Then Chávez called the reform, and in 2007—when everyone assumed it’d pass—the student movement organized. Tragedies like the Faur brothers’ kidnapping mobilized students nationwide.
In 2007, there was fierce debate on whether to participate. Strong arguments, like today. Chávez pushed the reform feeling invincible, aiming to roll back fundamental rights.
Jurists and politicians said participating would legitimize it—a risk. But not participating meant letting Chávez win. We chose to risk it, against some opposition (like María Corina Machado, then against participation).
We defeated Chávez. He barely acknowledged it, but we won. That opened the door for the 2008 elections, rebuilding opposition unity and electoral strength—a nine-year plan (2006-2015) that made the opposition a majority.
In 2015, many thought we’d won Miraflores. But politics requires patience and negotiation. We wanted power overnight. The government isn’t naive—I’m not justifying them; they’re undemocratic. But we’ve also been impatient.
What I’ve learned since 2007? Differentiate. At UCV, we beat chavismo in student elections. We studied with chavistas, shared cafeterias, had mutual friends. Politics can’t be about destroying the adversary.
Chavismo is now a clear minority, but one you must respect. You won’t eliminate chavismo—just as chavismo, with all its power, hasn’t eliminated the opposition.
Part of the problem is not believing in the idea of a transition—only rupture, rushing processes. Few of my 2007 peers remain in politics. Politics is the art of the possible, consensus-building. Impatience has consumed much of the opposition.
Have we been at this for 25 years? Yes—partly because those in power don’t believe in democracy. But we’ve also been too impatient at key moments. We must build a viable political alternative that can attain power. That’s what I believe.
