Opposition former deputy Luis Florido is running again for the National Assembly on May 25 with the party Un Nuevo Tiempo. Photo: Elías Ferrer.
Guacamaya, May 8, 2025. Luis Florido was a founding member of the party Voluntad Popular, which he left in 2018 after disagreeing with the decision to abstain from that year’s presidential elections. Later, he joined the opposition party Un Nuevo Tiempo, the only party that supported Edmundo González in last year’s presidential elections and has remained on the ballot for the upcoming May 25 elections.
Florido was a deputy in the National Assembly for the state of Lara and chaired the AN’s Foreign Policy Committee between 2016 and 2018. He was also part of the opposition delegation that participated in the 2017-2018 dialogue in the Dominican Republic with members of the Venezuelan government, an international effort to help resolve the country’s political conflict.
In 2025, he has decided to run again for the National Assembly, ten years later, in a different and complex context, holding the 8th spot on the National List.
We asked him about the elections, his role in negotiations with the government, reflections on dialogue processes, constitutional reform, U.S. sanctions, and Venezuela’s political future.
Question: In December, it will be 10 years since the opposition’s victory in the 2015 National Assembly elections. Yet no political change was achieved. What lessons were learned since then? Why return to the Assembly in 2025?
Answer: That’s a very good question, because many of us have reflected on what happened. What occurs in a negotiation process—because in Venezuela, for a long time, there has been a negotiation, but a violent, combative one—is that it should have been a much more political negotiation. I believe some actors have contributed to distorting that. But the logical thing would have been for us to seek understanding in 2016.
Here’s an example: in 2016, Henry Ramos Allup was president [of the Assembly]; one vice president was Enrique Márquez. At the time, I was in Voluntad Popular, and we proposed to Henry Ramos: we must talk with Aristóbulo, we must build bridges for democratic coexistence. Notice the term—one I coined in the Dominican Republic and which was even used in the Barbados negotiations: “democratic coexistence,” a coexistence between opposites, but based on democracy, and of course, on majorities and so on.
But that didn’t happen because, at the time, Julio Borges opposed it. Because Julio Borges was unhappy about not being given the presidency of the Assembly in that first term. So he opposed it, and because of that opposition, that negotiation—which would have later allowed for democratic coexistence between the National Assembly and, at the time, the president—could not be established. Because, regardless of the claims in 2013 about whether Maduro won or not, those claims could not be proven in the end.
So, I think the main lesson is that National Assemblies are spaces for politics. And politics is based on dialogue, negotiation, and, of course, agreements. That has been my experience.
Another example: the most positive outcome for me from that Assembly was the parliamentary dynamic we built. Everything flowed smoothly. We functioned better than the MUD and the Unitary Platform. Agreements were reached faster among people from different organizations, across different committees. Progress was made toward a clear objective, though, of course, distorted by the issue of agreements.
Another mistake we made in 2016 was arriving with threats against the government, saying we would have a proposal ready in six months. I think we should have been much more patient. And that approach was heavily pushed by Leopoldo López, who insisted on having a plan to remove the government immediately.
Well, it happened with the exit attempt in 2014, and then in 2016, the logical thing would have been for us to wait for a democratic coexistence agreement in the National Assembly, and then with the 2018 elections. But that didn’t happen, and everything became distorted. And everything that happened, happened. The contempt declaration came first. And the government’s contempt declaration was out of fear that we would immediately call for a Constituent Assembly or obtain a two-thirds majority to push for much stronger measures. Which was entirely and absolutely undemocratic on Maduro’s part and those in power today.
I think the lesson here is that politics is meant to be practiced. It’s about ensuring things don’t move faster than they should.
“Today we are a majority, but a majority with a tendency to demobilize.”
Q: What does running in these regional and legislative elections on May 25 mean, after July 28?
A: I believe all this—2015 and 2025—is connected. How? Because 2015 was part of a struggle. By 2015, these people had already been in power for 15 years, right? Approximately. So these dates are connected by the same struggle, the same fight for the political change Venezuela deserves, needs, and demands.
Today we are a majority, but a majority with a tendency to demobilize. That creates a big problem for us. And that’s why, for example, I’m running in these elections, alongside all my comrades in this struggle, to call on Venezuelans to keep fighting.
Past experiences with abstention—with reasons, mind you, because they all had reasons—have been very bad, as they led to the consolidation of the system we have today. For example, the 2005 abstention.
The 2005-2010 period was when the institutional framework of those in power today was consolidated. The 2017 abstention strengthened them regionally. The 2018 abstention handed the presidency to Maduro without a fight. The 2020 abstention handed the National Assembly back to them without opposition, because those who were there all these years never raised a hand to say, “I’m against what Maduro proposes.”
And well, we said: let’s go to 2024. We went to 2024. And the advantage of going to 2024 is that we have something: we know what happened there, we know what went on. And they know it too.
That’s why 2025 is also connected to 2024, because it’s part of the same struggle. Now it’s an electoral struggle, one where you have something to show, because the other struggles lead nowhere.
And what options do Venezuelans have?
Option one: after 2024, after July 28, leave the country. I don’t want to leave the country. I don’t want people to leave the country.
Option two: disengage from politics, stay at home, don’t read the news, isolate yourself. That’s not an option either.
Option three: the path of violence. Well, start mobilizing people and creating… I don’t think that’s a viable route. I don’t think it leads anywhere.
And option four is to strengthen the democratic path, even though those in power have tried to weaken it. The key is to keep voting, because the vote belongs to the people.
Q: After the July 28 elections, there were hundreds of arrests, including former presidential candidate Enrique Márquez, and the number of political prisoners remains high according to various organizations. What measures or actions will you take regarding this situation?
A: I believe the key to their freedom will largely depend on what happens on May 25. And I think that’s what will help push for negotiation. But if you don’t have much leverage, it will be much harder. That is, if you don’t have the political strength to negotiate—because all parliaments negotiate, whether in the U.S., Colombia, Brazil, Chile, or Europe. So, obviously, you need strength for that.
Q: UNT is the only party that supported Edmundo González in the July 28 elections and has managed to participate in these upcoming elections, while the MPV—another opposition party that intended to run—was excluded, as denounced by its spokespeople. Why was UNT allowed to run and not the MPV? Was there any negotiation with Chavismo to preserve UNT’s ballot access? Have you been in contact with MPV figures?
A: Everyone in the opposition knows we’ve been talking with the government for a long time. For Edmundo to become a candidate, there were negotiations with the government. First, there were talks about María Corina [Machado], then within the framework of Barbados, then about Corina Yoris, and later about other proposals.
Omar Barboza was among the proposed candidates. Later, thanks to Manuel Rosales, the electoral path was saved because we were at risk of having no candidate due to a lack of agreement. If no agreement had been reached, no one would have been registered, and those in power would have taken advantage of that.
Thanks to Un Nuevo Tiempo pushing for negotiation—which is what we’ve always advocated, because UNT has never hidden its agenda: negotiation and voting—Edmundo’s candidacy was ultimately secured. Even before that, negotiations made the primary elections possible.
This same process of dialogue, of seeking solutions, was also applied to the issue of political prisoners. That has been discussed as well.
In short, I believe we must return to politics.
“María Corina said at the time that she was pleasantly surprised by Manuel Rosales’ stance. That wasn’t made public.”
Q: María Corina Machado has labeled opposition leaders who participate in these elections as traitors. Do you have a message for her and the opposition sector that supports abstention and the “maximum pressure” approach?
A: Well, the thing is, Un Nuevo Tiempo supported her after she won the primaries. We backed her; she was the opposition’s candidate. Then she named Corina Yoris, and we supported Corina Yoris because she endorsed her. Later, in a meeting, she proposed Edmundo, and Rosales—after outlining all the risks—said: “Let’s do one thing: I propose we approve Edmundo’s candidacy unanimously.” María Corina remarked at the time that she was pleasantly surprised by Manuel Rosales’ stance.
That wasn’t public; it was private. But it shows that we supported her at every step of the electoral process. She abandoned that path, despite always insisting she wouldn’t. We, however, remain consistent with what we’ve said. Everything we’ve achieved has been through the electoral path, and that’s where we stand.
Q: Let’s talk about the constitutional reform proposed by the government. What do you plan to do about it? Are you considering influencing or stopping it? What opportunities do you see?
A: No, I think proposing constitutional reform right now is absurd. In 2007, it was absurd too. When Chávez pushed for reform, we opposed it and defended the Constitution—even though we hadn’t supported its approval in 1999. Later, he proposed an amendment for indefinite reelection, which passed. Today, much of Chavismo is against it; they say that was Chávez’s biggest mistake.
Now, tampering with the Constitution again—just to strip more rights from Venezuelans—is outrageous. Especially if it means undermining Article 5, which states that sovereignty resides irrevocably in the people, exercised through voting. Instead, they want to replace it with comunas (communal councils). So, comunas would become the center of Venezuelan politics. And knowing this government, they’d create a “Ministry of Communes” to decide who can and can’t participate. It would turn into indirect elections.
That alone is extremely dangerous for Venezuelans. We must fight it with everything we’ve got. And every person who abstains should realize that the government is pushing this precisely because people don’t vote. They’ll say: “Since they’re demoralized, now is the time to strike.” That’s why we tell people: even if you’re demoralized, even if you know the government will attack.
Q: Let’s shift to the geopolitical context surrounding Venezuela’s conflict. Luis, you chaired the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee in 2015. Regarding the suspension of oil licenses, Juan González said the only winner would be China. Recently, we’ve seen closer ties with Russia and China—like Putin’s call with Maduro or Delcy Rodríguez’s visit to China. How does the Venezuelan opposition view this growing dependence on Moscow and Beijing?
A: During the 2015 Assembly, I was part of the U.S. and China friendship groups. I believe good relations with China, like with the U.S., should be part of Venezuela’s state policy. Foreign policy must be a state policy. The only thing I agreed with Chávez on was multipolarity—we must be a strong Latin American bloc to negotiate globally, especially in trade.
These back-and-forth sanctions are bad news for Venezuelans—not for those in power. People think sanctions hurt Maduro, but no, they hurt the Venezuelan people. Less money means more crisis: lower GDP, higher inflation, payment imbalances. The economy worsens. Repeating the sanctions recipe is a mistake.
The U.S. has its own agenda. For them, it’s a problem. For us, the ideal would be Venezuela selling oil to multiple countries.
If we’d stuck to Caldera’s plan to produce 6 million barrels daily, today we’d be at 10 million. Instead, we’re below 1 million, trapped in a sanctions-driven crisis. Look at Cuba: 66 years under sanctions, no political change.
The best way to achieve change is through negotiation and elections—not maximum pressure. That’s already proven ineffective.
“The government made it clear in Barbados who they wouldn’t hand power to. The negotiation team told part of the story, but the rest came out in the media. Since I wasn’t there, I’ll say it: The government feared some opposition groups would send them to the guillotine if they took power.”
Q: Economists like Asdrúbal Oliveros and Jesús Palacios warn that Chevron and other oil firms are crucial to Venezuela’s forex market, and losing their dollars will deepen the crisis. Yet opposition figures like Julio Borges, María Corina Machado, and Leopoldo López supported Trump’s revocation of oil licenses. What message is the participating opposition sending on this issue?
A: Some still push that policy, and Miami’s electorate weighs heavily in these matters.
Our message is: We must return to politics. Maximum pressure failed in 2014—read the history, it achieved nothing. Sanctions started in 2017 and changed nothing—they’ve found ways to sell oil anyway. The solution isn’t there. It’s in rebuilding social dialogue and democratic coexistence.
But that can’t happen if those in power distrust their counterparts—and we can’t fully trust them either. Still, we must forge a different path: one that combines negotiation and elections.
The government in Barbados openly stated who they’d never yield to. The negotiation team shared part of the story, but the rest leaked. Since I wasn’t there, I’ll say it: They feared certain opposition groups would put their “necks on the guillotine.”
That’s what they tried to avoid from the start, but it didn’t work. The primary process—where people chose the toughest talker—didn’t help. Primaries are good for reflecting popular will, but Venezuela needs a different process: one that advances democratization.
Q: UNT has fielded a candidate for the governorship of Guayana Esequiba, an electoral district that has been at the center of debate and controversy. The ICJ has demanded the suspension of these elections while Guyana has increased its military spending and received support from the United States through Marco Rubio. What is your position on this situation?
A: Look, we have defended [Venezuela’s claim]—I did so while on the Foreign Policy Committee—and I justified voting in the Esequibo referendum by saying: I cannot be inconsistent. I cannot defend the Esequibo, advocate for it in the Foreign Policy Committee, even meet with everyone involved in this issue, and then turn around and tell people not to participate in the referendum. On some points, I voted yes; on others, no—because ultimately, it’s about defending sovereignty.
But defending sovereignty is not done as in the past, with weapons or war. I believe a warlike agenda helps no one. The real agenda here is to strengthen the 1966 Geneva Agreements. That is the agenda. It was clearly established there—it’s the only document both parties have signed—and I believe we must remain within that framework of the Geneva Agreements to eventually reach an agreement with Guyana under those terms.
Q: What is your opinion of the first months of the new Trump administration regarding Venezuela? I’m referring to the threat against TPS, the deportations of Venezuelans to El Salvador, and the criminalization of our migrants—even though U.S. intelligence says there is no evidence to support the exaggerations about the Tren de Aragua. Opposition leaders, particularly María Corina Machado, Leopoldo López, and Juan Guaidó—who maintain strong ties with Florida Republican senators and Secretary of State Marco Rubio—have been accused of being ambiguous about the situation of Venezuelan migrants in the U.S. How do you assess this situation, and what is your party’s position?
A: Look, I believe the damage done by the anti-immigrant—in this case, anti-Venezuelan—agenda is almost irreparable. Because we’re not talking about the Tren de Aragua. The Tren de Aragua is a fairly small group; it needs to be properly investigated. It’s a group that didn’t even have total control in Venezuela. There are many criminal groups here: the Tren del Llano, the Tejerías group, the 905 group—meaning there were different leaders, different gang heads.
U.S. security agencies have confirmed that the Tren de Aragua doesn’t even have the connections that were claimed. I think this does great harm to ordinary Venezuelans, to the Venezuelan who left seeking a better future in the U.S. And I also believe—with all due respect to President Trump, because ultimately he is the U.S. president, elected by Americans—that his agenda against TPS is doing great harm to Venezuelans.
TPS is a necessity for Venezuelans there, for Venezuelans who have the right to that better future. Just look at the numbers: everyone speaks highly of Venezuelans and their education. Nearly 50% of Venezuelans in the U.S. have third-, fourth-, or fifth-level degrees, the same as in Spain. In Spain, about 50% of Venezuelans hold such degrees. The same happens in the rest of Latin America, like in Argentina.
The detentions that have occurred—sometimes unjustly—of people accused of being Tren de Aragua members are unfounded. We’ve seen many cases linked to this, many mistakes made by the administration regarding Venezuelans. But it’s not just the Americans who have amplified the Tren de Aragua narrative.
As for the ambiguity, I think it’s tied to the “maximum pressure” agenda. And I don’t subscribe to that agenda. I support a responsible agenda, a nationalist agenda, a Venezuelanist agenda.
I defend Venezuelans wherever they go. Moreover, my political history is linked to migrants, to supporting them wherever they are. I have a daughter in London, a daughter in Spain, a nephew in Chile, a sister in Israel, a sister in Panama—meaning, I have family all over the world. So for us, ensuring Venezuelans have rights and are treated well is the agenda we must strengthen from within Venezuela.
Q: Other opposition members accuse your party of being soft on Chavismo, of negotiating with Maduro, and of breaking opposition unity. Some have even called for sanctions against politicians like you who will participate in the May 25 elections. How do you respond to these accusations? Aren’t you afraid of being sanctioned by the U.S.?
A: Not in the slightest, because the unofficial conversations we’ve had with different sectors respect what we’re doing in Venezuela. And everyone knows the electoral agenda is one we must continue. In fact, I’ll tell you something—there are international actors who say we are heroes—yes, you heard that right—because we are continuing the fight. Everyone knows abstention leads nowhere—it leads to nothing.
I’ll tell you that I left Voluntad Popular in 2018, mainly after I stood up and said: “We must participate in these 2018 elections, because otherwise, we’ll end up with nothing.” But because people’s anger was so great, they rode that anger and promoted abstention. And in the end, people were left with nothing—that’s where we ended up. The same thing happened before, in 2005, with the National Assembly. Where did Chavismo strengthen itself between 2005 and 2010? That’s where it gained all the institutional power it holds today. This is the agenda the world sees as the one to follow: the electoral agenda.
The Marines are not coming here, no matter what some may think—it’s not going to happen. Countries are focused on their own issues. Take Ukraine, which has all of Europe’s attention; the South China Sea, which has all of Asia focused on it; the Middle East with Israel, the Houthis, and Iran—spanning Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iran—which absorbs much of the U.S. military’s focus.
No one is coming to solve our problems here. We have to solve them. And the agenda must be one of negotiation and continuing with both negotiation and voting. I understand people sometimes get frustrated when we talk about negotiation, because it has been very tough and difficult to negotiate with those in power today—but there is no other way.
“In 2017 and 2018, we managed to establish an international process. I helped assemble the international component of what became known as the ‘Group of Friends of Venezuela.’ The foreign ministers present proposed agreements that would democratize Venezuela. I was among those who argued we should approve them wholeheartedly to force the government to be the ones to reject them. But then came the minimalism—adding and removing clauses. And with the same actors, which is the most regrettable part.”
Q: Luis, you were part of the Venezuelan opposition delegation that participated in the Santo Domingo dialogues in the Dominican Republic. Figures like Julio Borges were also present. At the time, there were divisions within the opposition, and accusations that talking to Maduro legitimized him. What lessons did you take from that negotiation process, and how do they connect to today’s circumstances?
A: The issue of political coherence: some who voted in 2005 against the entire opposition’s stance are now calling for abstention, for example. But the reflection from 2017 and 2018 was enlightening. In what sense? In that we managed to establish an international process. I helped assemble the international component of what became known as the “Group of Friends of Venezuela.” We chose Mexico, Paraguay, and Chile; the government chose Nicaragua, Bolivia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. And well, the agreements proposed by the foreign ministers are there. They proposed agreements that would democratize Venezuela in the Negotiating Commission. I was among those who argued we should approve them wholeheartedly to force the government to be the ones to reject them. But then came the minimalism—adding and removing clauses. And with the same actors, which is the most regrettable part. So, by December 2017, it fell apart. Then came January 2018, and the European sanctions against those in power, and the government responded by calling early elections. They scheduled them for April but held them in May.
At that time, the main lesson was, as lawyers say, “Sometimes a bad agreement is better than a great fight.” The agreement on the table, while not the best, was one that could have led to a better outcome in that presidential election.
After that, we debated whether to field a presidential candidate or not. The people you mentioned talked about Lorenzo Mendoza being the candidate, but since he didn’t want to, the remaining option was Henry Ramos Allup. They said: “We won’t support Henry Ramos Allup,” and turned against him while calling for abstention. In my opinion, Ramos Allup made a mistake by not running—he should have gone to that election because he had the support of most National Assembly deputies. In the end, he decided not to run, saying “the parties calling for abstention will destroy my image.” This time, we’ve decided to overcome that blackmail and speak the truth to the people.
“I wish today we had the entire opposition calling on people to vote. That would be the best way to honor July 28 and to challenge those in power.”
Q: Celso Amorim, President Lula’s foreign policy advisor, once told El País: “In Venezuela, we need a solution both sides can accept, even if it’s not ideal for either.” In your view, what should be the role of the international community in Venezuela in the coming months?
A: The international community’s role is very important—but not to exert maximum pressure. The agenda must be one of negotiation to seek political solutions. Here, it can’t be all or nothing. It can’t be a situation where one person wins and the others have to leave the country, go into exile, or seek refuge in embassies, as is happening now. But it also can’t be the opposite, because that doesn’t lead to solutions either. If you do that, a government like this could have an unstable foundation. Those who think Maduro is weak and almost finished… Well, these people have been in power for 26 years, so I believe we must build solutions that create mechanisms for a negotiated transition, one that opens the possibility for Venezuela to move toward common ground.
I was struck by how Luis Almagro, before leaving the OAS, ended up advocating for cohabitation in Venezuela. For someone who had supported the most radical agenda to say that means he concluded Venezuela must go through a process where no one wins completely. I connect this to how one of the most hardline parties once tweeted: “Venezuela needs a political negotiation where all sides have a chance,” but then quickly deleted it due to criticism.
Leaders cannot base their actions on what’s popular or not. We must guide people and “light a lamp where there is darkness.” That is our job—not to blindly follow what people or social media say, because sometimes it’s not the right path, and in Venezuela’s case, even less so.
Q: F.W. de Klerk, former South African president and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, a key figure in the transition to end apartheid alongside Nelson Mandela, said in 2019 regarding Venezuela’s conflict: “Venezuela’s leaders need to negotiate without too many preconditions.” He recommended unconditional dialogue to prevent the tragedy from becoming a catastrophe. As someone who has negotiated with Chavismo, what does that statement mean to you in Venezuela’s current context? Do you believe preconditions have been, among other factors, an obstacle to reaching sustainable agreements respected by all?
A: Mandela did not exist without de Klerk, and de Klerk did not exist without Mandela. They were a symbiosis of what the path to democracy and inclusion meant. I’ve been to South Africa—I know the country. When you talk to people, they speak of the Rainbow Revolution and the inclusion of all. I learned a song called “Shosholoza,” an African peace song about a train traveling across Africa, a metaphor for the continent’s unity. During the Dominican Republic negotiations, I recalled the spirit of that song because it inspired Mandela greatly, and the Afrikaners, as the whites are called, ended up integrating into society. It’s unfortunate that South Africa is slipping back into extremism, because that doesn’t lead to peace. But in any case, I believe we must follow the path South Africa took at that time. Some see a negotiated solution for Venezuela as unthinkable. I see it as perfectly viable—it can be built, but we must swallow hard. Negotiating doesn’t mean adopting the other side’s banners. It means understanding that your positions won’t be the ones that prevail entirely—it’ll be a middle ground, and those are the possible, viable points. That’s how agreements have happened throughout the world.
There’s a book by one of the negotiators with the IRA, a radical group in Northern Ireland, called “Negotiating with Terrorists,” and it illustrates how you must engage with the most radical factions to achieve peace. Well, these are people who have advised Venezuela in the negotiation processes we’ve been part of. We must abandon maximalist agendas.
I wish today we had the entire opposition calling on people to vote. That would be the best way to honor July 28 and to challenge those in power.
