Delcy Rodríguez, Executive Vice President of Venezuela and Minister of Hydrocarbons arrived in China on Wednesday, April 23 for an official visit. Photo: Press Vice Presidency of the Republic.
Guacamaya, April 23, 2025. The Executive Vice President and also Minister of Hydrocarbons of Venezuela, Delcy Rodríguez, landed in Beijing for an official visit on Wednesday. The visit takes place in a global context dominated by geopolitical competition between the United States and China.
While Washington reimposes oil sanctions aimed at isolating the government of Nicolás Maduro, Beijing maintains its strategic support, evidencing a bet to strengthen its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, consolidate its access to energy resources at preferential prices and erode American hegemony in the hemisphere.
China and Venezuela: an alliance in times of containment and sanctions
The arrival of Delcy Rodríguez in Beijing was not just another diplomatic gesture: it represented a reaffirmation of bilateral commitment at a time of renewed U.S. pressure. In her statements, the Venezuelan official emphasized “complementarity” as the axis of a relationship “proven and enduring,” while presenting concrete proposals outlined by Nicolás Maduro to deepen cooperation with China.
It is relevant to take into account the background, interests, and geopolitical objectives at stake with their respective implications in the relations between China and Venezuela.
This visit occurs in a geopolitical environment marked by two key dynamics: the reestablishment of oil sanctions by the U.S. toward Venezuela and the ongoing trade and technology war between Washington and Beijing. In this scenario, China has taken advantage of the Western vacuum to position itself as Venezuela’s main partner, not only in terms of energy trade, but also as a geostrategic actor willing to challenge the exclusion logics imposed by U.S. foreign policy.
Oil, debt and geoeconomy: the intersecting interests
During Donald Trump’s first administration, China—particularly its private refineries known as “teapots”—emerged as one of the main buyers of Venezuelan crude, benefiting from significant discounts that reached up to 40 dollars per barrel compared to Brent. Despite the risks linked to the U.S. financial system, these companies maintained their purchases, becoming an escape route for Caracas in the face of sanctions.
In February 2025, Venezuelan exports to China reached 500,000 barrels per day, the highest volume since June 2023, according to Reuters data. This rebound occurs in parallel with the reactivation of sanctions by the U.S., which could again redirect the flow of crude toward Asia and away from Europe and North America, as already happened before the issuance of specific licenses by OFAC in 2022-2023.
To this is added a statement by Juan González, Special Assistant to the President and Director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council during the Biden administration in an exclusive interview granted to Guacamaya regarding the cancellation of Western oil companies like Chevron.
“The only clear winner here is China. Now that Chevron helped stabilize and even increase Venezuelan production, Beijing will step in to buy more oil—with a discount, outside the formal system, and without being subject to the compliance and transparency requirements that were demanded of Chevron,” said González.
The geopolitics of oil
In the chapter “Venezuelan oil sector: the licenses at the center of the discussion” from the book On Sanctions in Venezuela, economists Asdrúbal Oliveros Porras and Jesús Palacios Chacín establish that the granting of specific licenses by OFAC significantly transformed the pattern of Venezuela’s oil exports.
According to the authors, these licenses caused a shift in the traditional destinations of Venezuelan crude: while in 2021 China absorbed 491,000 barrels per day (bpd), in 2024 this figure dropped to 310,000 bpd, in favor of markets such as the United States, Europe, and India. Likewise, a decrease was evident in the participation of opaque intermediaries, the so-called “ghost traders” who went from handling practically the entire oil trade in 2021 to seeing a decrease in their participation due to the presence of Western companies.
Another crucial change was the reduction in Venezuela’s dependence on Iranian condensate, as companies authorized by OFAC began importing diluents from Western countries, which facilitated the production of extra-heavy crude in the Orinoco Oil Belt.
With the withdrawal of oil licenses and the reimposition of sanctions on the oil sector, the door is opened for Venezuelan crude to end up in China with discounted prices very favorable to the interests of the Asian power.
In her contribution to the book On Sanctions in Venezuela, economist Tamara Herrera notes that joint ventures with Chinese and Russian participation such as Sinovensa and Petromonagas have maintained relatively stable production, representing about 20% of the national total. However, she warns that, in the face of the revocation of the licenses—a move undertaken by the Trump administration—only China has the financial capacity to compensate for the production loss that this would imply. Russia, in contrast, lacks the economic muscle necessary to take on that role. This fact is not a minor issue as, regardless of whether it happens or not, it could be an important piece in the current geopolitical context and highlight the importance of these approaches.
China thus positions itself as one of the most relevant partners of sanctioned Venezuela.
China not only imports oil: it is also Venezuela’s largest creditor, with loans amounting to 65 billion dollars, more than double those granted to Brazil. The China-Venezuela Joint Fund established various infrastructure and cooperation projects with oil as collateral, the vast majority of which never materialized.
This debt has encouraged oil payment agreements and could be a decisive factor for the consolidation of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) with Chinese capital in Venezuelan territory. Although that has significant obstacles in the way such as the inefficiency of public services in Venezuela and the lack of infrastructure in the country.
Special Economic Zones and China’s Caribbean geopolitics
The visits to China by the governors of Carabobo and La Guaira, states where two key SEZs with Caribbean access are located in 2024, reflected the interest of both countries in structuring new platforms of productive cooperation. Caracas could become a nodal point of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Caribbean, which would allow Beijing to gain strategic access to Central and South America, while consolidating its maritime presence in a region historically under U.S. influence. China has already been undertaking similar projects in the Caribbean, the most emblematic case being a deep-water port in Antigua and Barbuda.
The possibility that China pushes for an SEZ in Venezuela with Caribbean access also responds to its diplomatic ambitions: seven of the twelve countries that still recognize Taiwan are in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Beijing is determined to reduce that number before 2040, one of President Xi Jinping’s priority goals. However, something like that is currently far from being realized in the Venezuelan case.
Space Cooperation: The Least Visible Axis
One of the least visible but most strategic aspects of this relationship has been space cooperation. Since 2008, with the launch of the Venesat-1, also known as the Simón Bolívar Satellite, Venezuela has relied on Chinese satellite technology to advance what it calls “technological sovereignty,” telecommunications, and monitoring. This collaboration, which also includes the VRSS-1 and VRSS-2 observation satellites, has not only given Venezuela its first space capabilities but has also been part of China’s broader effort to strengthen its geospatial influence in the Western Hemisphere.
These advancements have been accompanied by technology transfers, technical training, and the construction of infrastructure such as the Capitán Manuel Ríos Aerospace Base in El Sombrero, Guárico State, with Chinese assistance. While this cooperation has raised Venezuela’s technological profile, it has also drawn criticism due to the structural dependence it creates on Beijing, as well as the high costs involved in a context of economic and multidimensional crisis.
This component has become a key piece in China’s aspirations in the technological rivalry with the West while bolstering its geopolitical influence in Latin America, where it cooperates in this field with other countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
In this context, Nicolás Maduro recently announced the upcoming launch of the Guaicaipuro satellite. This communications satellite, actively developed with Chinese participation, aims to expand rural internet access and secure protected communication channels for state security agencies. Maduro emphasized that the project will be integrated into the 2025-2031 National Development Plan, incorporating China’s technological, scientific, and financial support as a structural pillar of the national model.
Beyond its functional purpose, this satellite represents a political response to foreign technological alternatives. In recent statements, Maduro contrasted this alliance with private solutions promoted by figures like Elon Musk, who has shown support for the Venezuelan opposition. The government has thus prioritized cooperation with China as tensions with the U.S. escalate—a strategy Maduro uses to align more closely with nations challenging American hegemony. Meanwhile, the U.S., by suspending oil licenses, is losing its ability to influence Venezuela.
This strategic direction was reinforced in 2023 when the Bolivarian Agency for Space Activities (ABAE) and the China National Space Administration (CNSA) signed a joint declaration to deepen collaboration in space research and technology. Among the most ambitious elements of the agreement is Venezuela’s potential participation in the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a Beijing- and Moscow-led initiative to establish a scientific base on the Moon’s south pole by 2030.
China reiterated this invitation on April 8, 2023, expressing interest in integrating Venezuela into the Chang’e Program, which since 2007 has marked China’s advances in lunar exploration. Venezuela’s inclusion in this project would carry high symbolic and strategic value.
This axis of cooperation demonstrates how the China-Venezuela relationship extends beyond economics, oil, or bilateral politics, reaching into highly symbolic and strategic spheres like outer space. For Venezuela, it represents a channel to strengthen its “technological autonomy” against traditional Western power centers. For China, it is another avenue to consolidate a multipolar international order, where its leadership in innovation and South-South cooperation presents a concrete alternative to Western dominance. Additionally, it strengthens China’s presence in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela—a country whose geographic conditions offer significant advantages for space exploration in the coming decades. A Venezuela increasingly isolated from the West will become even more dependent on China’s interests and plans, as well as those of other powers.
Venezuela: A Potential Strategic Hub for Space Exploration?
Beyond technical cooperation and geopolitical considerations, Venezuela’s potential to become a key territory for space activities in the coming decades is supported by its geography, which is favorable for launches and orbital operations. Its location, topographic features, and access to oceanic corridors create an environment that, under the right conditions, could position the country as a strategic platform for space exploration in the Western Hemisphere.
One of the most relevant factors is its proximity to the Earth’s equator—a critical advantage for space launches. Situated between 0° and 12° north latitude, Venezuela benefits from the planet’s highest rotational speed in this zone, reducing fuel requirements for placing satellites into orbit, especially those destined for geostationary trajectories. This is the same advantage exploited by countries like France through the Guiana Space Centre in Kourou, located at around 5° north latitude.
In this sense, Venezuela could position itself as an attractive regional alternative for countries or companies seeking to reduce orbital costs without relying on overcrowded or geopolitically constrained launch sites. This becomes even more significant in an increasingly fragmented world where space militarization is rising, and the geopolitical rivalry between the U.S. and China extends into outer space.
Additionally, access to east-facing coastal areas, such as the Caribbean and Atlantic coasts, allows for safe launch trajectories over the ocean, minimizing risks to civilian populations in case of failures or rocket stage separations. This is complemented by vast, sparsely populated regions like Guayana, southern Amazonas, and the Esequibo territory, which—with investment, better conditions, and planning—could host launch facilities, laboratories, or observation centers.
However, these natural advantages must be weighed against climatic and structural challenges. The tropical climate, with high humidity, heavy rainfall, and storm risks, could complicate regular operations—though elevated or arid zones like parts of the Venezuelan Andes might offer more stable conditions. In terms of infrastructure, the country has a limited but relevant satellite history, driven precisely by cooperation with China.
The real obstacle lies in structural factors such as political instability, economic crisis, and a shortage of specialized Venezuelan talent. Venezuela’s participation in ambitious projects like the ILRS demands a robust and sustained scientific foundation, which is currently undermined by internal political-economic constraints and a lack of infrastructure.
Nevertheless, in a scenario of greater internal stability and strategic international cooperation, Venezuela could become a key logistical partner for regional space operations—particularly in launching small satellites or even serving as an attractive hub for third-country infrastructure, such as Russia (which needs to expand its satellite network for the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic) and China (which seeks to increase its satellite count). Both could find a strategic enclave in the Western Hemisphere for these activities.
An important consideration is that for China to match the U.S. in sheer numbers of active satellites, it would need to launch at least 5,000 more in a short time. But to rival the U.S. in strategic dominance, commercial coverage, and orbital control, the challenge is far more complex and long-term.
One of China’s plans involves the Guowang mega-constellations, aiming to launch up to 13,000 LEO satellites in the next 10-15 years—similar to Starlink. Territories with Venezuela’s geographic conditions could prove attractive for such a project.
It’s worth noting that while China has made significant progress, it still lags in rapid commercial launches and rocket reusability—though it is developing its own versions, such as the Long March 9 or Falcon 9-style reusable rockets.
Even if Venezuela currently lacks the capabilities and infrastructure to develop a competitive space industry, its geographic advantages will remain for a long time. Thus, even if the Venezuelan state cannot currently execute or secure the necessary alliances, this potential should not be ignored at a time when the space race is gaining increasing significance. In this context, the decline of U.S. influence and Venezuela’s growing dependence on countries like Russia and China will also have implications in this area.
Within the framework of systemic rivalry between China and the U.S., Caracas emerges as a piece on the board in the new global architecture. The alliance with China not only provides economic oxygen to Maduro but also serves as an effective mechanism to challenge U.S. unilateralism and advance toward a new multipolar order—with implications spanning from oil to space cooperation. These issues will undoubtedly be on the agenda during Delcy Rodríguez’s visit to China.
